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Books 1 and 10 of Plato's Republic have long been regarded as 
problematic when viewed alongside the Republic as a whole. Scholars 
have claimed that these books were originally written separately, that 
the placement of these books impedes and obscures the main portion 
of the work, or that the style and content of these books is not up to 
the standards set by Books 2 through 9. 
This paper seeks to settle the questions concerning Books 1 and 10 
by analyzing their dramatic function in the composition of the 
Republic. Primarily, this is done by showing that the structure of the 
entire work is based on the analogies of the Divided Line and the Cave, 
so that the Republic reflects the journey of the philosopher (in his 
ascent to the surface and return to the Cave) in the content of the 
discussions which Socrates holds with his interlocutors. The Republic 
also reflects the levels of knowledge portrayed on the Divided Line in 
the different capacities for understanding which are displayed by the 
dramatis persoaae of the dialogue. 
This analysis shows that these books are in fact integral parts of the 
Republic, performing several functions which enhance the work as a 
whole. Book 1 shows the metaphorical prisoners of the Cave and how 
Socrates attempts to correct their incomplete, misleading, or incorrect 
conceptions of Justice. Glaucon and Adeimantus, with their refusal to 
accept the situation at the end of Book 1, force the discussion into 
higher and higher levels of understanding, culminating with the 
description of the offspring of the Good in Book 6. The discourse on 
the decline of the individual and the sute in Books 8-9 returns the 
level of understanding once again to that of the prisoners in the Cave. 
Book 10 shows Poetry in the context of the Cave, and the Myth or Er 
becomes the poetic analogy of the Republic, with which Socrates 
attempts to give the message of the rest of the work to those whose 
comprehension falls short of understanding it in its philosophic form. 
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Chapter One 
Scholarly Opinions on Books 1 and 10 
Books 1 and 10 of Plato's Republic have long been regarded as 
puzzling and somewhat out of place in a dialogue that is otherwise 
considered one of the most renowned works in Western literature and 
philosophy. While acknowledging the greatness of the Republic, critics have, 
at various times, judged the content of both books to be sophistic, juvenile, 
contradictory, or only very distantly related to the remainder of the 
composition. Even when the critics can offer explanations for these 
purported blemishes, the explanations serve only to gloss over what are still 
perceived as defects in the dialogue. In this chapter I will examine 
criticisms of Books 1 and 10 and propose a solution which may solve some of 
the difficulties in interpreting these Books, as well as the Republic as a 
whole. 
* 
A long line of scholars have seen Book 1 as an earlier dialogue on 
justice in the Socratic manner, suggesting that Plato was dissatisfied with 
this dialogue initially and set it aside, realizing that the subject required 
much more extensive treatment. Later, (this theory continues) he worked it 
into the Republic as an introduction to a work which better expressed his 
thoughts on justice.1 The highly dramatic presentation, the discussion 
1 
2 
centering around a single topic, and the destruction of established opinions 
without putting forward anything new to replace them are all traits 
reminiscent of the early dialogues, and it is easy to see how a reader can 
come to the conclusion that this book was written separately, especially 
when compared to the remainder of the Republic, where drama is almost 
completely lacking, a multitude of subjects raise their heads at every turn, 
and Socrates does virtually nothing but teach. However, these differences in 
style and content are the least of the criticisms leveled at Book 1. 
More serious are the criticisms of the arguments used by Socrates to 
refute his interlocutors, especially Thrasymachus. They are roundly 
denounced as "complicated, specious, and amusing "2, 'dubious"*, "irritating"4, 
"weak and unconvincing to an amazing degree"3, and "simply fallacious"6. It 
is true that the critics who make these statements usually try to advance 
some reason for the pitiful state of these arguments, such as "the traditional 
definitions of justice have been reduced to shambles, revealing the need for 
a fresh start"7; "they have not defined justice, but they have succeeded in 
defining the problem of justice"8; or 
There is no reason to think that [Plato] considered these 
arguments fallacious, or realized how bad they are, but he did 
see that a Thrasymachus or a Callicles would think them only 
trivial and quibbling. ... In the rest of the Republic we move to 
a different style of arguing...' 
3 
These "apologies" for Book 1 point in the right direction; they state 
that there is some external reason for writing these arguments into the 
dialogue here, although they all still tacitly condemn the fact that the 
arguments exist at all, being as bad as they are. The assumption here, 
implicit or explicit, is that Plato did not realize how bad Book 1 is, how 
"trivial and quibbling" it appears when compared to the remainder of the 
Republic. Scholars would rather just ignore Book 1, and a final type of 
criticism recommends that we do just that. 
The final theory states that the arguments in Book 1 are not to be 
taken seriously: they merely clear away any previous misconceptions of 
what justice is, so that we are prepared for the "true" answer to the question 
"What is justice?" when it is given in the following books. It seems that we 
must hurry through the philosophical "site preparation" of Book 1 as quickly 
as possible in order to reach the point where the dialogue really begins, with 
the challenges by Glaucon and Adeimantus. White says in his Preface: 
I urge readers of all kinds not to dwell too much on Book 1 of 
the Republic. It is an introduction and is not intended by Plato 
to be a complete, or even a fully cogent, treatment of the issues 
which it broaches it is not even a good book to use in 
introductory courses in philosophy... because it annoys students 
more than it stimulates their thoughts, and it convinces them 
that Plato and Socrates were dishonest. Readers of the Republic 
should not allow themselves to become bogged down in it.10 
4 
White also notes at the end of his commentary on Book 1, "the serious 
part of Plato's discussion of justice is to follow, in Books 2-10...".11 Rather 
than try to make any sense out of the arguments in Book 1, this type of 
criticism suggests that we should almost pretend that the Book is not there 
(and perhaps wonder how Plato could have taught his introductory 
Philosophy courses with it). After reading these types of criticism, we 
should be very much surprised if in reading Book 1 we did not become 
bored with its triteness, annoyed at its dishonesty, or eager to see how much 
Plato's thought had changed since last he took up his quill. 
The situation with Book 10 is similar to that of Book 1. Many critics 
express their disappointment at the bathetic conclusion to an otherwise 
impressive work, and point out that the metaphysics, esthetics, and 
psychology of Book 10 are at odds with the rest of the Republic. Annas 
states her dissatisfaction very strongly: 
Why did Plato not end the Republic with Book 9, instead of 
tacking on this collection of further points, hanging together 
rather awkwardly and most very problematic? We can only 
make suggestions, and the most obvious is this. Plato always 
wanted to show that justice was ... worth having both for itself 
and its consequences.... The bulk of the Republic is Plato's most 
successful attempt. ... Ideas that have powerful expression in 
the main coherent body of the book are presented at the end in 
a much cruder form, which Plato none the less believes can add 
to our understanding. And so the Republic, a powerful and 
otherwise impressively unified book, acquired its lame and 
messy ending.12 
5 
Besides the criticisms of its content, there also exist the same doubts 
as to this Book's original inclusion with the Republic: Else has argued that 
Book 10 consists of no less than four separate sections, written at different 
times, which were later "tacked onto" the work as we have it in response to 
the theories of art and poetry which Aristotle was supposedly spreading 
through the Academy in the years before Plato's death.13 Plato, in a gallant 
last effort to combat this fifth column, rewrote and added to an original Book 
10 material designed specifically to refute Aristotle's theses. Although most 
scholars dismiss this hypothesis, and are willing to grant the original 
character of the Book, they also refer to it as an "appendix"14, or 
"excresence "1^ which Plato added to the end of the Republic, for one of 
several reasons, depending on which section of Book 10 they are attempting 
to justify. The section on the banning of imitative poetry is said to be placed 
here because it would have disrupted the unity of the rest of the Republic.16 
or because it requires an understanding of material covered in the 
intervening books.17 The section on the immortality of the soul is placed 
here because it prepares for the myth of Er, and the myth of Er is here 
because it allows Plato to show that justice is also advantageous for the 
rewards which accompany it, something he could not do in the previous 
books. Perhaps it is a measure of our desperation with Book 10 that we 
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look so anxiously for an explanation of its awkwardness, since, unlike Book 1, 
we are not dealing with refutations of naive persons or sophists, but with 
ideas put forward by Socrates (or Plato) himself. 
These are the criticisms leveled at Books 1 and 10: the Books are so 
radically different from the rest of the Republic in style, content, and 
characterization that they do not belong with the other Books; their 
arguments are pitiful; and they could therefore easily be done away with, 
leaving a much more cohesive and impressive work. There is an element of 
truth in some of these criticisms; it is intuitively obvious that Books 1 and 10 
differ from the others, but whether they were written at different times 
than the rest of the Republic is something that is ultimately both 
unknowable and inconsequential. What is important is that even if Plato did 
write them twenty years earlier, or later, in radically different styles, yet 
when the Republic as a whole was composed Plato "published" it in the form 
in which we have it. Therefore we are either left with the interpretation 
that Plato was insensitive to the contrast in style, characterization, and 
content, in which case these differences mean nothing other than Plato was 
not the literary craftsman he is esteemed to be, or that, considering the 
exacting sense of artistry and literary craftsmanship seen in the dialogues, 
Plato was very much aware of these distinctions and in fact placed them 
7 
there intentionally, which means that they must fulfill some purpose in the 
Republic. 
This latter suggestion leads us to consider the second type of criticism; 
namely, that the arguments used in these Books are weak at best and 
fallacious at worst. Even if we grant the truth of these comments, is it 
really possible that Plato could have been so insensitive to the nature of 
these arguments? This is a central question for readers of the Republic: how 
can a work so carefully constructed, so rich in thought, and with themes so 
intricately interwoven contain such seemingly blatant gauchness? If the 
arguments are as patently obvious as is claimed, the suggestion is ludicrous. 
Yet even if they are only the weapons which Socrates uses to disarm 
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, why write them in at all? Why waste our 
time in recounting mistaken opinions of men long dead? The same question 
confronts the third criticism, that the first book is a frivolous waste of time 
which delays our arrival at the "real" dialogue: why? If the construction of 
Book 1 is so flawed and its ideas so worthless, why does Plato not simply 
begin with Glaucon's statement of the three types of good and his demand to 
have justice defended? Why does he do such violence to his reputation as a 
writer and as a philosopher by serving us such trifles? The excuses that 
Book 1 sets the stage for the remainder of the dialogue or introduces the 
8 
problem at least show the understanding that Book 1 does have a function in 
the Republic which extends beyond the quality of its arguments or the style 
with which it was written. This type of explanation, given to resolve the 
"problems" of Books 1 and 10, is only partially satisfactory; we are left 
content with the thought that these Books are indeed original members of 
the Republic, but uncertain as to what this arrangement really means. Can 
we find an explanation for Book 1 and 10 which will not only explain why 
they were written in such a manner, but also show that they make such a 
great deal of sense that way that they could hardly have been written 
otherwise? 
H.D.F. Kitto, in his book Poiesis. shows how our interpretation of Greek 
literature can be clarified considerably by examining T) owSeais TUJV 
TTpayptfTW, the arrangement of the material in a literary work, and how 
this arrangement affects the meaning of the work we are examining. Kitto 
deals primarily with Attic drama, but also discusses Homer, Plato, and 
Thuycidides as well. His argument is basically that Greek literature, until the 
mid-fourth century, is meant to be read both intellectually and 
imaginatively — its form is inseparable from its content. In many instances, 
therefore, an awareness of the organization of the material in the work we 
are reading will help us understand it better: as in the Oresteia. the Qdvssev. 
9 
or even Pindar's Odes, for example. A salient characteristic that Kitto finds 
in these works is the method of making a point without stating it explicitly; 
as he says, "Why keep a dog and bark yourself?" 
In Greek literature the skeleton is more important than in other 
literatures, and accordingly the flesh is less ample. Aeschylus 
writes for Eteocles that final speech about Polyneices and Dike 
just before the two brothers kill each other, and he leaves the 
audience to draw the obvious conclusion...We now have to face 
the horrid fact that even writers of prose would do this kind of 
thing, with of course the same consequences: we can gravely 
misunderstand their meaning if we insist on reading them as 
prosaically as possible We shall find that even Plato could 
write in this mimetic tradition - as indeed Aristotle implies, 
when he includes "the Socratic dialogues" among his few 
illustrations of mimesis in prose.18 
The Republic itself, being one of the foremost of the "Socratic 
dialogues', can certainly be considered imitative poetry from beginning to 
end, and we may recall another passage from the Poetics: Aristotle notes that 
one of the reasons why Homer is so preeminent among epic poets is that "he 
alone....is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the 
poem. The poet should say very little himself, as he is no imitator when 
doing that ".1' Except for several short sections at the beginning (e.g., 327a-
328c, 336b, 357a), the Republic is composed entirely of direct quotation, and 
Plato never reveals a character's unspoken thoughts, much less speaks in the 
first person. Plato, on this evidence, is writing imitative poetry himself; we 
will want to remember this when we discuss Book 10. 
10 
The fact that the Platonic dialogues are not only expositions is obvious; 
therefore, if the Republic is not exclusively an expositiory treatise, but also a 
drama, the examination of the work from the standpoint of its structure and 
the disposition of its material is valid, and answers to the troubling questions 
about Books 1 and 10 may be found in this structure. We cannot be certain 
that a knowledge of what is said in the Republic will accurately convey 
Plato's thought to us without the corresponding knowledge of where and 
how it is said. As Bloom states: 
The dialogue...is an organic unity. Every argument must be 
interpreted dramatically, for every argument is incomplete in 
itself and only the context can supply the missing links. And 
every dramatic detail must be interpreted philosophically, 
because these details contain the images of the problems which 
complete the arguments.20 
If, then, we have difficulty understanding Books 1 and 10, it is more 
than possible that the difficulty lies in our misunderstanding of the 
structure, and not in our understanding of the material itself. We may 
analyze and dispute the individual arguments we find there, taken out of 
context and without regard for the overall purpose of the Republic, and thus 
convince ourselves that we have found Plato out, discovering places where 
he was obviously wrong or unsure of what he was doing. 
It is the purpose of this paper to show that Plato knew exactly what 
he was doing when he wrote Books 1 and 10, and that the criticisms leveled 
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against them are not valid, since Plato could change his prose style if he 
wished, even in the same work, and did, in fact, construct the Republic in 
exactly this way for dramatic and philosophical purpose. Throughout the 
Republic, the level of understanding shown by each of the dramatis oersonae 
is analogous to one of the levels of understanding described on the Divided 
Line, and the entire work is an allegory of the Philosopher's journey similar 
to that described in the analogy of the Cave in Book 7. Books 1 and 10 
represent to the reader graphically and dramatically the people and opinions 
of the lowest level of the Cave, and the characters in Book 1 are intentionally 
depicted as groping in the realm of eiKacria, with their discussions centering 
around common terms and the opinions commonly held about those terms, 
these opinions being the misconceptions or eiKoves of these characters. The 
challenges by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2 raise the discussion above 
this level and begin the allegorical ascent from the Cave, which continues 
until we reach the Forms and the similes of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the 
central Books. The discussion of the decay of the state and the individual in 
Books 8-9 begins to return to a more mundane level, reflecting the dialogue's 
descent through its subject matter, and in Book 10 we return completely to 
the shadows of ekaaia. This paper will show Plato's method in this 
arrangement by examining the nature of the arguments used in Book 1 (as 
opposed to the validity of the arguments themselves), the characterization of 
the participants in Book 1, and the elements of the narrative which 
foreshadow the Line and the Cave. A shorter chapter on Books 2-9 will 
examine the sections in the central Books where the text mirrors the changes 
in the dialogue, reflecting again the structure of the Line and the allegorical 
journey of the philosopher. This will be followed by a scrutiny of the 
content of Book 10, keeping in mind the structure of the Republic as a whole, 
to show that Book 10 can only be considered a failure, or anti-climactic, by 
failing to take into consideration its place and purpose. As the level of 
understanding descends once more to eiKacria. and the philosopher returns 
to the Cave to dispute over shadows of phantoms of Justice, Socrates speaks 
to these people again, but at their own level of understanding. 
Of course, a great deal of the interpretation of any Platonic dialogue 
depends on the purpose the interpreter believes the dialogue has. In this 
paper, it will be assumed that the Republic was written not only to expound 
doctrine, but to incite the reader to think further and more deeply on the 
issues it raises. Indeed, part of the purpose of this paper is to show that 
Books 1 and 10 make the Republic all the more effective in provoking 
vigorous objections and further discussion because of Books 1 and 10. 
13 
Plato's Republic thus becomes both a picture of Fifth century Athens and a 
process which occurs in our minds whenever we read it. 
Kitto says, concerning the use of his method, 
Proof, in such a case, can never be rigid, but in order to be 
acceptable it must satisfy certain conditions. Such a method of 
composition must be shown to be habitual with the author; it 
should be seen to combine naturally with, and to help explain, 
other features of his composition; it will also be a 
recommendation if (to put it bluntly) it makes the author and 
his work look less incompetent than does the other approach...21 
Considering some of the opinions expressed about Books 1 and 10, 
there is a great opportunity here to make Plato look less incompetent, and 
Kitto has shown that this method of composition, in which the TTO{T)CJIS7 or 
crafting of the matter, is just as important as the \e£is, or the text itself, was 
habitual with Greek from Homer down to Plato. His discussions of 
the Gorgias and the Protagoras show that an understanding of Plato's 
can help to explain the sometimes bewildering structure and 
content of these two dialogues, but an even clearer illustration of Plato's use 
of TTOIT|<JIS in this fashion - to lead the reader, almost physically, by the 
structure of the text, through the same experiences described in the content 
of the text - can be seen in the opening lines of the Phaedo. 
The elaborate opening conversation of this dialogue, some 35 lines 
explaining in minute and apparently pointless detail the exact timing of 
14 
Socrates' execution, both begins and ends in the prison, with Socrates on the 
day of his death. It is thus cast in a circular pattern, echoing the chief 
doctrine to be argued in the dialogue, the circular pattern of the soul's 
existence, coming from a previous life, passing through this one, and 
returning at death whence it came. As the reader progresses through these 
opening lines, he recapitulates in his own experience the cyclical nature of 
life, as he encounters the following phrases:22 
. . .  T r a p e y e v o u  Z c u K p a T e i  e K e i v x )  TQ lVepg FJ TO (j>ap|jiaKOv emev ev 
I Tip Sea^umpiq)... (were you with Socrates on that day when he 
I drank the poison in the prison?) 
I ET\jyjEV yap TQ TRPOTEPAIG TT^S SIKT^S T| "rrpiipiva ECRREMJIVT) TO€ 
I I TTXOIOD O EIS AfjXov 'AQRIVAIOI TREIMODCRIV.... (For the stern of the 
I I boat which the Athenians send to Delphi happened to be crowned on 
I I the day before the trial) 
I I 
I I ... TIP oCv 'ATTOXXIDVI TJU^AVTO... (they prayed to Apollo) 
I I I  
I I I v6^os ecrrtv AUTOTS... jju|8eva &TTOKTeiKUVCCI, Trpiv av eis AFJXOY 
I I I TG A<T>IK7ITAI TO TTXOIOV Kai TTOXIV Seflpo... (it is their law...to kill 
I I I no one until the boat goes to Delos and comes back) 
I I I  
I I 1 . . .  O iepeiis TOV 'ATTOXXWVOS (the priest of Apollo) 
I | crreijfxi TT\V Ttpij(ivav TON TTXOIOIT TOVTO 8' enjxev... TQ 
I irpoTepaig RNS 8IKT|S yeyovos... (crowns the stern of the boat... 
I and this happened to occur on the day before the trial) 
1 8ia TocuTa Kai TTOXIIS XPO^OS iyeveio t$ IcoKpaTei ev Tq) 
SEAPWNRIPIQ) O P,ETA|IL TFJS 8IKT]S TG Kai TOU ©avchrou. (because of 
these things Socrates was in the prison a long time between the 
trial and his death) 
15 
The structure of the vocabulary in this section reflects the material 
being discussed, foreshadows the doctrine put forward later in the dialogue, 
and leads the reader through a protreptic experience of it. It is clear, then , 
that Plato was familiar with the sort of Troi^ais discussed by Kitto and used 
it to good effect in several of his dialogues. Let us turn to the Republic and 
see if, considering its importance among his dialogues, Plato might have also 
found it useful, indeed indispensable, to have employed this same TTOITICTIS 
in constructing this most intricately interwoven of dialogues. 
16 
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Chapter Two 
Book 1: Its Place in the Republic 
Criticisms of Book 1 tend to make the point that its differences from 
the rest of the Republic would indicate either that it had a separate origin, or 
that it is somehow "unworthy" of the rest of the work. The arguments in this 
chapter will attempt to show that this Book foreshadows the Cave, the levels 
of understanding on the Divided Line, and the types of men that Socrates is 
to describe in Books 6-9, and is thus an integral part of the Republic. 
reflecting not only the situations from which the great analogies of the 
central Books are drawn, but also the need to define Justice and show that it 
is worthwhile pursuing, so that young men like those listening to Socrates 
may be inspired to follow the philosopher s path, rather than the tyrant s. 
Book 1 begins at the lowest level of reality, in the realm of ekacria, and the 
characters, situations, and arguments which Plato portrays in this Book 
foreshadow the realities and the corresponding mentalities and characters 
which the Divided Line and the Cave portray in allegory. 
In addition to the criticisms noted in Chapter 1, several odd situations 
in Book 1 demand attention. Why do Cephalus, Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, 
and Cleitophon ail make appearances in Book 1 and nowhere else, with one 
exception at the beginning of Book 5? Are we supposed to take Socrates' 
18 
arguments and refutations seriously? And why do Glaucon and Adeimantus 
say nothing in Book 1 (with one important exception), and then monopolize 
the rest of Socrates' time in the Republic? If these things are merely literary 
devices on Plato's part, then there is no need to take further notice of them, 
since they are only "thrown in" before the dialogue "really" begins; there is 
the possibility, however, that they are just the sort of dramatic details which 
Bloom claims "must be interpreted philosophically, because these details 
contain the images of the problems which complete the arguments".1 
As in many of the dialogues, the wealth of narrative details ends with 
the beginning of the "philosophical" portion, and should prompt us, as was 
supposed in the first chapter, to see whether there is a "philosophical" reason 
for these seemingly "dramatic" details. Instead of getting through Book 1 as 
quickly as possible, then, we will examine closely how it is written, paying 
special attention to plot and characterization. This will enable us not only to 
show that the common criticisms of Book 1 miss the point, but also that the 
book is in fact well suited to its purpose in the Republic. 
I. Ptot 
One of the distinguishing features of the Republic is the manner in 
which Plato interweaves so many topics in a deceptively unadorned style. 
Sider gives an example: 
Consider ...the discussion on literature and music in Books II-Ill. 
There are enough forward and backward looking references by 
Socrates to make the gross divisions of literature and music; 
piety, bravery, and sophrosyne; content and form; gods and 
men; rhythm and harmony only partially satisfactory.2 
If Book 1 were an earlier composition, we should not expect to find 
this sort of cross-referencing woven into it, but this is just the thing that we 
do find. Bloom, for example, notes that in addition to being a discussion of 
Justice and the myriad of topics which accompany it. the Republic is also an 
extended Apology, showing Socrates put on trial by the young men he was 
accused of corrupting, and how he actually strives to improve them to the 
benefit of the city.' This happens in the case of the symbolic "seizing" of 
Socrates by the slave of Polemarchus (327b) and the subsequent 
confrontation with Polemarchus and his friends (327c-328b), which 
foreshadows the practical problem of the impotence of philosophy in the 
Republic - the philosophers in most cities are forced to do the bidding of the 
"gentlemen", who control them through the power of the many.4 It also 
appears in the numerous legal and legislative metaphors that appear 
throughout the Republic: the debate and decision to remain in Piraeus (327c-
328b), the demand of a fine by Thrasymachus (337d), and the frequent 
references by Socrates to his trial and punishment if he fails.' The Republic 
is, then, not only an example of the ideal state, but also the exposition of 
Socrates' ideal apology - the full justification of his life and views which he 
would have presented at his trial if it were possible. This strand is 
introduced clearly in Book 1 and is woven through all the subsequent books. 
Another strand of plot obvious in the Republic is the philosopher's 
journey, set forth explicitly at Si5c ff., describing how the philosopher must 
start from the bottom of the Cave, work his way up to the contemplation of 
the sun, and then return to the Cave once more. While it is less obvious that 
Plato has woven a strong and definite foreshadowing of the journey to and 
from the Cave into the Republic from the beginning of Book 1, there are still 
a number of indications which strongly suggest that Plato is presaging the 
Cave in the events which he describes before the discussion of Justice even 
starts. Many of the details that precede this discussion could conceivably be 
left out, if we are reading the dialogue as a treatise, waiting for its "real" 
beginning: the description of the festival, the encounter with Polemarchus, 
the mention of the torch race on horseback, or even the group's arrival at the 
house of Gephalus are all really unnecessary to the discussion of Justice, 
unless these events perform functions which extend beyond what they 
simply say. Bloom has shown one of these functions in the case of the 
meeting with Polemarchus. If we examine these details with the idea that 
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they are setting a scene in the dramatic equivalent of the Cave, they do 
indeed make sense. 
The very first word of the work, Kcrre^y, makes us think at once of 
descending, and suggests a setting below some more desirable place, from 
which Socrates is very reluctant to stay away. In the Phaedrus. the only 
other dialogue in which Socrates departs from Athens, the following 
conversation takes place: 
Phaedrus. You don't leave the city, either to go abroad or even, 
it seems to me, to go outside the walls. 
Socrates. Forgive me, best of men, for I love learning, and the 
country and the trees don't want to teach me anything, but the 
men in the city do. (230d) 
Socrates does not leave Athens because only there can he engage in 
philosophy, and here, in the Republic, he is attempting to return to the city 
when he is accosted and amicably compelled to remain and talk, though 
unwillingly. Even more than reluctance of the historical Socrates to speak, 
this unwillingness presages the feelings of the philosopher who must return 
to the Cave and dispute with its prisoners, even though he would much 
rather remain above in contemplation of the Good. The contrast of Athens 
with the Piraeus underlines the parallel between the setting of the dialogue 
and the Cave: being the center of commercial activities, the Piraeus 
corresponds to the lowest, commercial class in the state and to the emOuiuai 
in the soul, while Athens, as the center for government, philosophy, and 
deliberative thought, corresponds to the ruling and calculating part of the 
soul. Physically, too, the cities will remind readers of the topography of the 
Cave, as the Piraeus lies at sea level, while Athens rises to the height of the 
Acropolis, and at the time of the dialogue (ca. 411) the two cities were joined 
by the Long Walls, providing a passage from one city to the other, just as a 
"rough, steep, upward way" lies between the Cave and the surface (515e). 
Also, Socrates is persuaded to remain in the Piraeus for a religious festival, 
rather than a philosophical discussion. This, as well as other references to 
religion in the opening tableau, seem to show that religion is the substitute 
for philosophy at this level of understanding. 
There are several verbal echoes of the description of the Cave in the 
opening of Book 1. The slave of Polemarchus comes up behind Socrates and 
Glaucon, takes hold of Socrates' himation. and commands them both to "stay 
there", ircpi|j^v€T£ (327b); later, in the description of the prisoners in the 
Cave, Socrates says "see men...with their legs and necks in bonds so that they 
are fixed" ujcrre [LAVEIV T€ CCUTOUS (514b). As the Cave is illuminated by 
fire, which gives it dim and unreliable light (514a), so in attempting to 
convince Socrates to remain with them in Book 1, Adeimantus promises him 
a torch-race on horseback that evening at the festival of the goddess Bendis 
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(328a), which, in addition to foreshadowing the fire in the Cave, also 
introduces another religious element. In describing Gephalus, Plato speaks of 
him as garlanded and just come from sacrificing, religious symbols which are 
later reinforced by the statements which Gephalus makes. Once again, the 
emphasis here is on religion, which is the traditional means of determining 
what is just. Gephalus continues Socrates' imagery of descent in his very 
first sentence, by speaking of his guest "coming down to the Piraeus" 
(K<CTafJaivu)v eis TOV neipaia) (328c), and of his own inability to go up to 
the city, foreshadowing again the return of the philosopher to the cave in 
Book 7, as well as admitting his own inability to make the journey out of the 
cave. 
A final point: why does Socrates mention in the first sentence that he 
was with Glaucon when he came down to the festival? Is this just a 
naturalistic detail, or is this perhaps a small indication that Glaucon, too, has 
come down to this place from higher regions? We will see indications that 
Glaucon is viewed throughout in a different light by Socrates; he is certainty 
at a higher level of understanding than anyone else in the dialogue (except 
for Socrates himself), and it will be natural to pair Socrates with Glaucon at 
the outset, since they are the ones who will actually pursue the vision of the 
RgPlMC-
When the actual discussion of Justice begins, Socrates, as has been 
observed by everyone since Thrasymachus, does not say what his definition 
of Justice is, but he contents himself with pointing up the inadequacies of 
everyone else's. But is this because he will not, or cannot? Clearly he can, 
since he spends the rest of the Republic defining the concept at length; why, 
then, is he unwilling to speak in Book 1 ? The traditional answer is that Plato 
did not yet have a dear concept of Justice when he wrote the "earler" Book 1, 
but a better answer is found in the images presented in the book. These 
images suggest, as we have seen, that the discussion is beginning at the 
lower reaches of the Cave, and the mentalities of the major interlocutors 
reinforce the suggestion: Cephalus refuses to discuss his beliefs, 
Thrasymachus is only interested in showing off his own rhetorical ability by 
trying to overcome Socrates, and Polemarchus is confused and unable to 
think through his position; none of these interlocutors would be able to 
understand or participate in the dialectic with which Socrates sets forth what 
he really thinks about Justice, and in fact none of them do participate in it. 
Plato's artistry in these details is deceiving, for it makes us forget that 
he could have begun the Republic with the discussion itself, as he did in such 
other dialogues as Ion or Meno. Since he did not, he must have expected his 
readers to make the effort to understand whv he did not. Socrates and the 
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discussions which he holds in Book 1 are a flesh-and-blood representation of 
the situation mentioned in Book 7, when the philosopher returns to the Cave 
and disputes with its inhabitants over the shadows of Justice. 
II CharaeteriMtkm 
The characterizations of Gephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus -
what they actually do say when they are not merely responding to the 
questions of Socrates - provide another solid link between Book 1 and the 
rest of the Republic, for Plato has carefully delineated these characters so as 
to exemplify the different levels of understanding described on the Divided 
Line in Book 6, and the different types of men described in Book 8. 
A. Gephalus: 
The character of Gephalus which emerges in Book 1 is that of an 
ayerage but good man, concerned with his reputation and trusting that the 
stories told about the gods and Justice are true. Gephalus has correctly 
identified the shadow of Justice on the wall, but has no idea what produces 
it, or even that it is something other than a shadow; he believes that it is 
Justice. His religious nature is evident in the statements which he makes 
about the afterlife: 
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As the pleasures of the body wither away, those connected with 
speech or reason increase (328d) 
Old age gives peace and freedom from the desires and pleasures 
of youth (329a-d) 
The decent man who is not poor is the one who bears old age 
easily (330a) 
The greatest good that comes from wealth is its ability to allay 
the fears of the afterlife by helping a man not to lie or cheat, 
and to give what is owed to gods and other men (330d-331b) 
The things which he says are commonplace slogans that most men 
could agree with, and we note that Socrates does not disagree with Gephalus 
or treat him harshly; his purpose is to have Gephalus refine his own 
definition of Justice rather than change it, since Gephalus acts very much as 
Socrates' ideally just man would; indeed, Socrates echoes the manner in 
which Gephalus talked about Justice when he proclaims (442e-443a) the list 
of items which the just man would never do: e.g., stealing a deposit, robbing 
a temple, neglecting parents. The reason why Socrates cannot allow this 
definition of Justice to pass unchallenged is that it is an ungrounded fancy 
(eiicacaa) which just happens to be right opinion (Soga). Gephalus has the 
correct concept of how to act justly, but he does not understand the reasons 
why he should act this way; he is merely following the myths and 
conventions of society, which is why he cannot discuss the matter further 
with Socrates, and withdraws. 
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Gephalus symbolizes the traditional, religious view of Justice: the gods 
ordain what is just and unjust, and all that men are required to do is to 
follow unquestioningly the injunctions of the gods. He is also a symbol of the 
traditional view of the afterlife, worrying over the stories of the 
punishments in Hades (a foreshadowing of the myth of Er in Book 10). He is 
mainly concerned with his money and private property in general, and he 
bases his definition of Justice on it. As soon as Socrates attempts to engage 
him in a discussion of this definition, however, he withdraws trpos TGL lepd 
("to the sacrifices" or "into the realm of the holy"); his conception of Justice is 
religious, and he cannot and will not subject it to the rational discussion 
which makes up the rest of the dialogue. 
Gephalus also foreshadows the model of the Democratic man in Book 8, 
with his constantly changing desires and preoccupations. In his youth, he 
exerted himself to make money and enjoy himself (330b, 330d-331a), but 
now he has "gotten religion" and attempts to atone for his past with the 
sacrifices he is now offering. In just this way Socrates describes the 
Democratic man: 
... he also lives along day by day, gratifying the desire that 
occurs to him, at one time drinking and listening to the flute, at 
another downing water and reducing; now practicing gymnastic, 
and again idling and neglecting everything; and sometimes even 
spending his time as though he were engaged in philosophy. 
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...there is neither order nor necessity in his iife, but calling this 
life sweet, free, and blessed he follows it throughout (561c-d) 
Finally, as Gephalus is dependent on the gods for his morality, so he is 
also dependent on his fellows for the means of expressing himself; when 
Socrates asks him about old age, the consolations of wealth, and the greatest 
good of wealth, Gephalus answers with quotations from Sophocles, 
Themistodes, and Pindar. In addition to reflecting the second-hand 
knowledge characteristic of the lowest reaches of the Cave (reflections of 
other's ideas), this also gives an example of the reason for Plato's revulsion 
toward poetry in Book 10: Gephalus is the sort of person who does what the 
gods say is just, and the oracles and poets tell him what the gods say. This is 
normally satisfactory; Gephalus knows that he should not lie or steal, but 
when a situation arises which is not covered in the Iliad or the Works and 
Days he is at a loss. This sort of person is also taken in by the beauty of 
what the poets say, and is inclined merely to redte quotations without 
critical or reflective thought. In sum, Gephalus shows himself to be very 
conventional in his opinions, which he has taken over wholesale from the 
poets without really thinking about them. Is this not the achetype of the 
prisoner at the lowest level of the cave? He has never thought about Justice; 
he will not even listen when someone tells him that the shadows which he is 
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so adept at identifying are not real, but at least he knows what the shadow 
of Justice looks like, and Socrates allows him to depart in peace. 
B. Polemarcus 
As Polemarchus is Gephalus' son and heir (33Id), following him in 
time, vigor, openness to argument, and intellectual perceptivity, thus his 
chracterization reflects the next levels up in the Cave and on the Divided 
Line. Polemarchus is literally the heir of the argument; he inherits his 
father's conventional morality, but he has been touched by the new 
intellectual freedom of Athens, and he is willing at least to discuss the 
reasons for his beliefs, trying to justify them to the satisfaction of Socrates 
without relying on religious sanctions. It is this willingness to argue that 
gets Polemarchus in trouble, because he has not thought out the basis for his 
orthodoxy and becomes extremely confused once he becomes involved in the 
argument, although at one point he feels strongly enough to say that he 
knows something is true, even if he cant explain why (334b). The things 
which Polemarchus does say are commonplace; most people would agree 
with them and most people, whether they would agree with them or not, live 
according to these precepts. 
It is just to give to each what is owed (33 le) 
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One owes good to friends and harm to enemies (332a) 
A friend is one who seems to be, and is, good, and an enemy is 
one vho seems to be, and is, bad (335a) 
In contrast to his father, though, Polemarchus makes one mistake 
which Socrates takes some pains to correct - the idea that enemies are 
"owed" evil. As in the case of Gephalus, Socrates is not interested in forcing 
his own definition on Polemarchus, only in correcting what he perceives are 
the weak points in others'. Polemarchus has also identified the image of 
Justice, and perhaps has some notion that there is more to it than just a 
shadow, but what that something is he cannot say. He has moved into terra 
incnanit* here, and has no idea where he is. Is he not a clear example of the 
prisoner in the Cave who realizes that something is making the shadows on 
the wall, but is still too confused to know what or how? Socrates is trying to 
encourage his curiosity by making him question the beliefs which he 
received from his father, and Socrates has succeeded to a certain extent, 
because at the end Polemarchus agrees to the very un-Greek idea that one 
should not do harm to one's enemies, a postilion which Gephalus could not 
have reached — he could not have stood up to the argumentation ~ and 
which shows some progress up toward the full light of day. 
Polemarchus represents the Oligarchic man, whom Socrates describes 
in Book 8 as principally concerned only with money (554a). Polemarchus is 
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honorable, but Socrates exposes his weakness by directing his first question 
to money and Polemarchus's attitude toward it (332a-b). The description of 
the Oligarch fits him very closely; 
... when such a man has a good reputation in other contractual 
relations—because he seems to be just—he is forcibly holding 
down bad desires, which are there, with some decent part of 
himself. He holds them down not by persuading them that they 
'had better not' nor by taming them with argument, but by 
necessity and fear... (554c-d) 
C Thrasymachus 
Thrasymachus is very different from both Gephalus and Polemarchus: 
he is very sure of his position and he is extremely eager to defend it. 
Justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c) 
The rulers in each city make laws to their advantage, and it is 
just for their subjects to obey them (338e-339a) 
The ruler is a ruler only in so far as he does not err in ruling; 
once he does, he is not a ruler (340d-341a) 
The ruler considers the ruled only in what ways they may 
benefit him (343b-343c) 
The unjust man always has more and is happier than the just 
man (343d-344c) 
Thrasymachus is obviously a different case, and Socrates must take a 
good deal of time and effort to show that he is completely wrong, rather than 
trying to make small adjustments in his view. He is also different in that 
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while the positions of Gephalus and Polemarchus were true, if vague and 
confused, reflections of Justice, those of Thrasymachus are perverse 
distortions of it. Yet Thrasymachus's logic is well developed - far superior to 
that of Gephalus and Polemarchus. His mentality thus seems to represent a 
higher level in the Cave and on the Divided Line, though a perverse one. He 
can well be described as one who has misunderstood and misinterpreted 
what he saw on the wall of the Cave. He is thus without a true mentality and 
perhaps insane. He certainly appears animalistic he is described as a wild 
beast (336b), and he is rude and insulting to Socrates, even in defeat. His 
attitude is "if we can't play by my rules, then I won't play the game." 
Therefore, although he argues his position strongly and forces Socrates to 
meets his objections in the rest of the Republic, his understanding in terms 
of reality can only be termed ayvoia, apprehending only TO jir) ov. When 
viewed in light of the vision of the Good, his conduct and opinions could 
legitimately be called insane, yet the arguments that Socrates uses to 
embarass him are, as we saw in Chapter 1, widely regarded as suspect: 
Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus all express their dissatisfaction with the 
state of the question after Thrasymachus's "surrender". The nature of the 
arguments which Socrates uses against Thrasymachus is a question which 
will be deferred until later in this chapter. 
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Thrasymachus is clearly the model of the Tyrannic man; he espouses 
whatever crimes one can get away with, and says that the Tyrant is most 
happy in his perfect injustice (344a). Socrates, in Book 9, mentions some of 
the deeds that a Tyrannic man might do in peacetime (575b); these sound 
very much like the acts Thrasymachus enumerates in Book 1 (344b). 
D. Cleitophon 
The neit character to be considered in the discussion of Book 1 is 
Cleitophon, who enters only long enough for a brief dispute with 
Polemarchus in the middle of the discussion Socrates is having with 
Thrasymachus. 
Justice, or the advantage of the stronger, is what the ruler 
believes to be his advantage (340a-b). 
We do not have much information here to allow us to say what real 
purpose the characterization of Cleitophon is fulfilling in the text. We may 
ask, however, why this break in the dialogue takes place. The logical point 
raised by the interruption is, of course, in what sense "the advantage of the 
stronger" is to be taken: whether it is what is actually the advantage of the 
stronger, or what seems to be the advantage of the stronger. The point must 
have been important to Plato, for in addition to this interruption, when 
Thrasymachus re-enters the discussion (340d-341a) he delivers a long 
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speech on the difference between one who is skilled in the general sense 
(i.e., who seems to be skilled) and one who is skilled in the strict sense (who 
is so in reality). 
What is gained by suspending the forward movement of the dialogue 
with these two very minor characters? A heightened awareness, probably, 
of the distinction between mere appearance and actuality, a distinction 
whose importance in the Republic as a whole cannot be underestimated. 
Every interruption in the Republic signals an important change, and this one 
elaborately points up a distinction which has already been introduced in 
Poiemarchus's discussion (of who a friend really is), and one which is 
continued by Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Socrates throughout the rest of the 
Republic.6 Since Socrates and Thrasymachus cannot interrupt themselves, 
and since Gephalus has already departed, other characters must enter. As 
soon as their function is complete, they disappear, having introduced, once 
again, a major theme of the remainder of the Republic in Book 1. 
As the debate with Thrasymachus continues, Glaucon also interrupts 
Socrates and Thrasymachus to ask Socrates what he means by saying that a 
penalty for afit ruling is one of the wages for rulers. Again, Glaucon does not 
say enough to characterize himself dearly in this short exchange; and the 
reply which Socrates gives will be examined in the next section, but it is 
interesting, and indicative of the attitude some scholars have toward the 
Republic, that the presence of Glaucon at this sole point of Book 1 (after the 
dialogue "really" begins) has prompted some to consider this section a later 
interpolation: 
...fthe interchange with Glaucon) looks very much...as though it 
came in after Book 1 became part of the Republic as a whole, for 
not only does Glaucon not appear again as a speaker till Book 2, 
but some of Socrates' claims about rulers read very oddly 
unless we have the central books in mind.7 
Such arguments compel us to guess that the statements of Cleitophon 
and Polemarchus must also be later interpolations, since neither character 
appears again in Book 1 (or Books 2-4 either). If we are simply plodding 
along through Book 1, reading the arguments without giving any thought to 
the context in which they occur, a passage like this is bound to sound like an 
interpolation. But if we can expand our contextual horizons, the passage 
makes sense in, and even contributes to, its location. In his current 
predicament, Thrasymachus has just finished changing his position. He 
started off by arguing with Socrates over what "the just" is, but now he has 
moved on to claim that the life of the unjust man is more profitable than 
that of the just man. By making Glaucon interrupt with his question at this 
point, Plato allows Socrates to do two things in his answer (347a-e); first, 
Socrates can tell a friendly observer his own feelings about the discussion, 
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i.e.t that he disagrees strongly with Thrasymachus over the original 
proposition (that the just is the advantage of the stronger), but that 
Thrasymachus's second statement (the life of the unjust is better than that of 
the just) is far more important. Second, Plato shows us, with just a bit of 
foreshadowing, what sort of person Glaucon is. Because he and Adeimantus 
have not taken any part in the discussion thus far, we have no idea as yet 
how they feel about all this. This short interruption shows that Glaucon is on 
the side of the angels, and thus his demand at the beginning of Book 2 to 
hear Socrates praise Justice comes as less of a surprise. The rest of Socrates' 
statement will be dealt with in the next section. 
We have seen that Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus follow 
the Divided Line and the Cave in their levels of awareness and 
argumentation, and foreshadow the characters of Book 8-9. In the following 
chapter we will see how Glaucon and Adeimantus fit into this pattern, but 
now let us examine Socrates. 
III. Levels of Argument 
The philosopher cannot speak to the prisoners of the Cave on his own 
level, but must do so in terms they can understand. When we examine the 
statements which Socrates makes to each of the characters in Book 1, it is 
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easy to see that they are shaped by his anticipation of the levels of reality 
and knowledge to be revealed in the doctrine of the Divided Line and the 
analogy of the Cave. Let us examine his rejoinders to the various 
interlocutors. 
Socrates to Cephalus: 
A borrowed sword should not be returned to a madman (331c) 
Socrates' only pronouncement to Cephalus is perfectly concrete, 
utilizing an obvious object of harm in an indisputably dangerous situation. 
Once Cephalus has agreed that returning a sword in such a situation would 
not be just, he has completely lost the grip on his own definition of Justice, 
and he immediately withdraws from the conversation and the dialogue. This 
inability to generalize shows that Cephalus is unable to climb higher on the 
Line or out of the Cave. 
Socrates to Polemarchus: 
A deposit Gf gold should not be returned to a friend, when this 
causes harm to either party (332a-b) 
Bloom notes that when Polemarchus steps in for his father, Socrates 
gives him the same type of example, but with an ambiguous twist: instead of 
a sword, which can only be used for harm, he substitutes money, which can 
harm or help either the borrower or the lender8. This forces Polemarchus up 
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a step on the Line and out of the Cave. From a slogan, Polemarchus is forced 
to think of a more general rule of conduct than his father could comprehend, 
and this is Socrates' general plan throughout his conversation; he leads 
Polemarchus to generalize and think in more abstract terms: 
The arts give what is owed and fitting to the objects of the arts 
(332c-d) 
a) medicine 
b)cooking 
The practitioner of an art must have someone in need of his art 
in order to practice it (332e) 
a) the doctor - patients 
b) the pilot - passengers 
For any specific matter, the skilled practitioner of an art is more 
useful than the just man (333a-c) 
a) the player of checkers 
b) the housebuilder 
c) the harp player 
d) the horse expert 
e) the shipbuilder 
Now that Polemarchus has generalized his own view, Socrates turns to 
arguments using Texvai as examples. These arguments are so simple and 
direct that Polemarchus has no trouble understanding them, although he is 
repeatedly led to acknowledge positions beyond what he originally intended. 
Socrates speaks to him in terms he understands, in order to lead him beyond 
his conventional reasoning. Polemarchus therefore comes to acknowledge 
that: 
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Justice seems to be useful for things which are not being used 
(333d-e) 
a) money on deposit 
b) a pruning hook 
c) a shield 
d) a lyre 
The expert practitioner of an art is also the expert at producing 
the opposite of the art's intended effect (333e-334b) 
a) the boxer 
b) the doctor 
c) the soldier 
d) the guard 
Socrates uses more arguments based on TEXVGLI, to help Polemarchus 
see the relationships which exist behind things, much as the cut-outs lie 
behind the shadows on the wall-
Men often mistake the good for enemies, and the bad for 
friends (334c-d) 
The man who actually is good is a friend, and the one who 
actually is bad, an enemy (334e-335a) 
Here Socrates raises for the first time the question of reality: what is 
the difference between being and seeming, and how can one know what that 
difference is? Though his purpose here is limited to making a point with 
Polemarchus this theme is raised throughout the Republic and is the 
cornerstone of the epistemoiogy discussed in Book 5. Once again, the 
elements of Book 1 foreshadow the rest of the Republic. 
When things are injured, they become worse in regard to their 
characteristic virtue (335b-c) 
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a) horses 
b)dogs 
c) humans 
The practitioners of an art cannot bring about its opposite effect 
when they practice their art correctly (335c-d) 
a) musicians 
b) horseman 
A condition cannot create its opposite (335d) 
a) heat - cold 
b) wet - dry 
Harming is thus the work of the unjust, rather than the just 
man (335d-e) 
By getting Polemarchus to agree to this conclusion, Socrates has 
succeeded in expanding the young man's mental horizons, since "harm your 
enemies with the same fervor that you love your friends" was almost second 
nature among the Greeks. By questioning the assumptions of his 
contemporaries, Polemarchus takes the first step toward becoming a 
philosopher. 
Socrates to Glaucon: 
Good men must be forced to rule, since they are not willing to 
rule for money or honor (347b-e) 
In this short speech there are no examples: Socrates instead speaks of 
several things that have had no place in the dialogue up to this point: "the 
most decent men", ol GCT01, "the love of honor", TO cjaXoTiyov, 
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"the love of money ", TO <J>I\dpyvpov, and "a city of good men, if it should 
come to be". As Annas remarked, this might sound very strange in Book 1, 
but if Glaucon did indeed "come down" with Socrates as the dialogue began, 
then there is nothing strange about it: Plato is continuing the device of 
having Socrates speak to his interlocutors in the Republic at the level of 
understanding which they can comprehend. The phrases quoted above, 
which Socrates uses in his short discussion with Glaucon, are substantized 
adjectives used as abstract terms. They are a stylistic innovation in late 5th 
Gentury Greek', and they point not only to the abstract reasoning which 
Socrates will employ with Glaucon and Adeimantus later, but also to the 
linguistic origins of Plato's theory of Forms. Here, however, they also show 
that Glaucon's understanding, as well as his motive for participating in the 
discussion, are different from that of all the other interlocutors, since 
Glaucon is not trying to propound or defend his personal view of Justice, but 
is eager to search for the truth, even if he is not familiar with it. His 
eagerness is reflected in his question to Socrates, the first legitimate question 
anyone has asked Socrates since the discussion began. Though Annas has 
asserted that "some of Socrates' claims about rulers read very oddly"10 
unless we look forward to the yet unseen central books, it is equally true 
that some things read very oddly unless they are carefully prepared for. and 
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Plato has done quite a bit of foreshadowing in Book 1 already. The astute 
reactions of Glaucon in Book 2 seem much more natural if we have some 
indication that he has not been thinking in simple terms thus far - and his 
characterization in Book 1 provides this amply. 
Socrates to Thrasymachus: 
People searching for gold would never willingly make way for 
one another in their search (336e) 
You cannot ask a question and then forbid a man to answer 
correctly (337b), e.g., how much is twelve? 
If the pankratiast is stronger than we are, and eats beef, then 
beef is advantageous and just for us (337c-d) 
If it is just both to obey the stronger, and to do what is to the 
stronger's advantage, then sometimes we will obey the stronger, 
but unwittingly do what is not to the stronger's advantage. 
Under Thrasymachus's definition, this would still be just. 
(338b-e) 
Socrates forces Thrasymachus to define his position more carefully 
than he presumably was accustomed to do, by speaking with a literalness 
which draws more insults from Thrasymachus. 
The arts provide what is advantageous to their objects, and are 
not concerned with wage-earning or the arts themselves (341c-
342c) 
a) medicine works to the advantage of the body 
b) horsemanship works to the advantage of the horse 
The practitioner of an art considers the advantage of what is 
ruled by it and is weaker than it (342c-e) 
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a) doctor - patients 
b) pilot - sailors 
None of the arts include wage-earning; that art is separate from 
all others (346a-347a) 
a) medicine furnishes health 
b) piloting furnishes safety in sailing 
c) housebuilding furnishes a house 
d) ruling furnishes benefit to those ruled 
Returning to the consideration of Texvai, Socrates manages, albeit 
with a great deal of resistance, to win his first concession from 
Thrasymachus: that the arts look to the advantage of their objects, not of 
their practitioners. This effectively divides ruling from exploitation and 
forces Thrasymachus to justify ir\€OV€£ia on its own grounds. But Socrates 
argues that: 
Men try to get the better of those who are unlike them, not of 
those who are like them (349b-350c) 
a) musical 
b) medical 
c) wise 
A common enterprise requires Justice among its members, even 
if the enterprise is unjust (351 c-352a) 
a) an individual 
b) a city 
c) an army 
d) pirates or robbers 
Each thing has a work which it alone can do, or can do better 
than other things (352d-353a) 
a) a horse 
b) eyes 
c) ears 
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d) a pruning knife 
Things cannot do their proper work without their proper virtue 
(353b-354a) 
a) eyes 
b)ears 
c) the soul 
By arguing that injustice is the work of the ignorant, that perfect 
injustice cannot accomplish anything, and that the unjust soul will be 
unhappy, Socrates manages to silence Thrasymachus, but the fine line that 
Plato has been walking here has often been noted: if Socrates cannot 
convince Thrasymachus that he is wrong, or at least cause him to withdraw 
from the argument, there is no opportunity for Glaucon and Adeimantus to 
come back and state the argument for injustice yet more strongly. But if 
Socrates defeats Thrasymachus utterly, there is likewise no reason to discuss 
Justice in such depth as the rest of the Republic does. Therefore the 
arguments with Thrasymachus fulfill several purposes; first, they continue 
the pattern of the level of understanding in Book 1, the three main 
interlocutors having but vague inklings of the reality of Justice. Second, they 
show how Socrates must argue with a Sophist: in lowering himself to 
Thrasymachus's level of discussion, his arguments, even though they "defeat" 
Thrasymachus, have been perenially condemned -- they are "sophistical" 
themselves ~ yet Socrates has, throughout Book 1, spoken to his 
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interlocutors in terms which they could understand. The discussion with 
Thrasymachus is no different; since Socrates silences the Sophist on his own 
ground, with his own chosen weapons, it would be surprising if the 
arguments Socrates uses in conversing with him did not contain "sophistic" 
elements. Finally, these sophistical arguments of Socrates provide a tight 
connection with the rest of the Republic. Thrasymachus states a position of 
ethical nihilism, but being a crude and overbearing person, he does so in a 
crude and overbearing manner, as would be expected of someone whose 
understanding is of TO ̂ T| OV. Socrates deals with him, but the doubts that 
Thrasymachus raises are not so easily dismissed, and in Book 2 Glaucon and 
Adeimantus "polish them up" in a way that Socrates cannot ignore or avoid 
answering. 
IVt StfPflHry 
At the end of Book 1, the state of the question is far from being a 
stalemate, or the orropia of many early dialogues. It is true that a valid 
definition of Justice has not been formulated, and Socrates himself says that 
he has not had a fine banquet, either8, but if we look at what has transpired, 
the view is broad, and compelling. 
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We have seen Socrates amicably compelled to engage in a 
conversation at a place and time which was not to his liking. When the 
discussion turned to Justice, Cephalus, Polemarchus,and Thrasymachus all 
claimed to have knowledge oT it, and while Socrates was content to refine 
and clarify the definitions of Cephalus and Polemarchus, he considered 
Thrasymachus to be completely wrong. In the course of these discussions, 
Plato, the author, has foreshadowed literarily the key topic of seeming 
versus actuality, the future level of Glaucon's understanding, and his own 
vision of a city filled with ideal or corrupt men. But the most important 
things he has foreshadowed are the metaphors of the Cave and the Divided 
Line. We have seen Socrates try to show everyone why their understanding 
of Justice is inadequate, using examples that are as elementary as his 
interlocutors can understand. Therefore, when we finally reach Books 6 and 
7, we encounter there passages which raise very strong feelings of deji vu 
when compared to Book 1. 
So you must go down, each in his turn, into the common 
dwelling of the others and get habituated along with them to 
seeing the dark things. And, in getting habituated to it, you will 
see ten thousand times better than the men there, and you'll 
know what each of the phantoms is, and of what it is a 
phantom, because you have seen the truth about fair, just, and 
good things. (520c) 
Do you suppose it is anything surprising if a man, come from 
acts of divine contemplation to the human things, is graceless 
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and looks quite ridiculous when - with his sight still dim and 
before he has gotten sufficiently accustomed to the surrounding 
darkness - he is compelled in courts or elsewhere to contest 
about the shadows of the just or the representations of which 
they are the shadows, and to dispute about the way things are 
understood by men who have never seen Justice itself? (517d-
e) 
The image of these two passages, of the philosopher returning to the 
cave with the knowledge of reality, but surrounded by men who have no 
point of reference save the shadows on the wall, recalls vividly the situation 
we encountered in Book 1, where all of Socrates' interlocutors are eager to 
parade a knowledge which Socrates must patiently try to show is made up of 
little but misconceptions. At this early level, Socrates cannot teach his 
interlocutors anything of what Justice truly is, since they have neither the 
desire nor the ability to see it, and so, frustrating as it must be for him (OTJ 
(JLCVTOI KOXUS ye CIATIA^AI - 354a), he must use only images of reality, 
images which they can understand. These images will not bring them true 
knowledge of Justice, but if planted in the right place, they may give birth to 
the desire to know more. In the neit chapter it will be suggested that the 
beginning of Book 2 indicates quite clearly that Glaucon and Adeimantus 
have this desire, and how this desire changes the personalities, methods, and 
topics of the remainder of the Republic. 
The measure of the true success of Book 1 may be seen precisely in 
the very degree of criticism it has provoked. The purpose of the Republic is 
to incite the reader to think more deeply on the issues raised. After reading 
what Thrasymachus has to say, most people want to see him refuted because 
of their hope that there is a nobler definition of Justice which can be 
intellectually justified. Socrates in Book 1 discredits Thrasymachus, but does 
not provide such a definition because, as we have seen, his interlocutors 
could not understand it; what he does provide is the impetus to thought 
which inspires Glaucon and Adeimantus to continue the discourse in Book 2, 
and which has caused so many critics to wring their hands over his words. 
Plato was an astute enough observer of human nature to know what sort of 
reaction Book 1 would provoke; he has reflected it exactly in the reactions of 
Glaucon and Adeimantus. Throughout the remainder of the Republic they 
are at pains not to let Socrates cheat them by leaving out of any section of 
the argument, as if they saw this entire discussion as something vastly more 
important than an afternoon's talk with friends. This urgency is lost if we 
remove Book 1, or condemn it, or rush through it to get at the "meat" of the 
dialogue. In Book 1, we see the situation as it still exists today among most 
of us: people urging either the Golden Rule or the Law of the Jungle; this 
dilemma prompts anyone who would be a philosopher to seek a deeper 
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understanding and a better way, and the rest of the Republic furnishes just 
that. 
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Notes for Chapter Two 
1. Bloom, p. xvl 
2. Sider, p. 337. 
3. Bloom, pp. 310-311. 
4. Bloom, p.311. 
5. E.g, 419a-420b, 450a, 451b-c, 474a, 607b. As these examples are 
all from later books, they show how Book 1 introduces another theme 
which is continued through the Republic. 
6. E.g., 360e-362a,365b-c, the entire discussion of knowledge in Book 
5,476c-480a. 
7. Annas, p. 47. 
8. Bloom, p. 317. 
9. Annas, p. 47. 
10. Havelock, pp. 256-261. 
11. ou iievToi KaXfis ye eicrriajjuii (354a) 
Chapter Three: 
The Central Books 
Books 2 through 9 have comparatively few dramatic details, but there 
are enough to show that the structural pattern established in Book 1, 
mirroring the structure of Socrates' Divided Line and the journey out of the 
Cave, continues through the central books. At each major change in the 
topics and levels of discussion, Plato gives us clear indications that the level 
of understanding required to follow the dialogue is changing, and he does 
this in terms borrowed from the Cave analogy. 
1. Books 2-4: The Ascent from the Cave 
According to that analogy, the first thing that happens in the 
departure of a prisoner from the Cave and the release from his bonds, is that 
he turns from the shadows on the wall to look at the fire for the first time 
(515c). This turning is motivated by his desire for truth, and his search for 
the truth results from that desire. Just such a process of turning and 
pursuing is described at the beginning of Book 2, as the desire to know now 
forces Glaucon and Adeimantus to turn away from the misconceptions and 
inconclusive arguments of Book 1 - the shadows on the wall - and demand 
that Socrates continue the argument, as they shake off their bonds and look 
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toward the fire of truth for the first time. This helps explain why Socrates' 
exchange with Glaucon in Book 1 was so different from all the other 
discussions in that book; Plato was indicating there that Glaucon was a man 
who would not remain in the realm of eiKaaia. Socrates, realizing this, 
spoke to him on a level the others would never reach: the level of voTyra, in 
which he could employ abstract concepts and terminology. This also helps 
explain the unusual employment of characters in Book 1, as contrasted with 
the remainder of the Republic. Glaucon and Adeimantus played virtually no 
role there because their mentalities did not belong to the same category as 
those of Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, since they were not 
interested in impressing the others with their fine thoughts and words on 
Justice. It is significant that the one passage in which Glaucon spoke in Book 
1 was prompted by his desire to understand more clearly a point of Socrates. 
Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato's own brothers, let the rest of the 
group dispute over the shadows on the wall, but when the rest have all 
fallen silent, for one reason or another, it is they who boldly come back to 
Socrates and say, "We are not satisfied; teach us more." By this act they 
signal their readiness to leave behind the bonds of the prisoners in the cave 
and start the long ascent to true knowledge. Socrates is delighted, and 
suggests that a divine intervention has occurred in the conversation: 
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I listened, and although I had always been full of wonder at the 
nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, at this time I was 
particularly delighted....For quite divine must 
ffftrtainiy h«ve happened to you, if you are remaining 
unpersuaded that Injustice is better than justice when you are 
able to speak that way on its behalf. (367e-368a) 
What in Glaucon's and Adeimantus's appeal has made Socrates so 
happy? Let us examine the arguments Glaucon and Adeimantus use in their 
challenges to Socrates, keeping in mind the sort of arguments we had seen in 
Book 1. 
Glaucon: 
There are three types of good (357b-357d) 
a) a good for its own sake 
b) a good for its own sake and its consequences 
c) a good for its consequences alone 
Injustice is praised by many, but not Justice. I want to hear 
Justice praised itself for itself GCUTO KCLQ corro (358a-d) 
The origin of Justice lies in an agreement made by those who 
are unable to do Injustice with vigor (358e-359a) 
Anyone who is able commits Injustice, if he thinks he can 
escape detection like Gyges, and he thinks that Injustice is more 
beneficial to him than Justice (359b-360d) 
Take a just and unjust man as an example, and give all honors 
and reputation for Justice to the unjust man, and the opposite to 
the just. Let them end their lives with the extreme 
consequences attendant on their respective reputations, and 
judge which of them is happier (360e-362c) 
Adeimantus: 
Men teach their children to be just, not because of Justice itself, 
but because of the rewards which both men and gods will 
bestow upon them (363a-e) 
Poets and priests say that Justice is good but difficult to achieve, 
and gods and men can be influenced by sacrifices and 
incantations (364a-365a) 
If the previous two statements are true, young men will realize 
that it is best to achieve the reputation for Justice without the 
hard work involved. If thereby they offend the gods, they will 
sacrifice and appease them with their ill-gotten gains (365a-
366b) 
No one is ever willingly just except the one who cannot be 
unjust, and even those who praise Justice never praise it for 
itself, but for the benefits which come from it. So tell us why it 
is good to possess Justice in itself (366b-367e) 
In comparing these arguments with those of Book 1, differences are 
immediately clear, and can be seen in both their content and form. 
Regarding content, Glaucon and Adeimantus emphasize again and again that 
they want to hear Justice praised "itself for itself'; they realize that there is 
a difference between being and seeming just; they take Justice out of the 
physical realm of right action and place it in the realm of character. In all 
these topics they are far in advance of the two basic definitions of Justice in 
Book 1: do good to your friends and harm to your enemies, or do whatever 
you can get away with. They take great pains that Socrates should not 
impute to them the positions they are expounding, but they also want him to 
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know that they are at a loss as to how they can refute ideas such as these. 
This is certainly a foreshadowing of the confusion of the newly-released 
prisoner, who knows that what he saw before were shadows, but is still too 
uncertain to understand the truth of what he now sees: 
Take a man who is released and suddenly compelled to stand 
up, to turn his neck around, to walk and look up toward the 
light; and who, moreover, in doing ail this is in pain and, 
because he is dazzled, is unable to make out those things whose 
shadows he saw before. (515c) 
In contrast to the arguments used by both Socrates and his 
interlocutors in Book 1, the form of these arguments also signals a change. 
Instead of relying on the tangible and specific, the statements of Glaucon and 
Adeimantus more nearly exhibit the traits of formal logical arguments: they 
itemize evidence, divide topics, use deduction, speak in universal terms ("no 
one", "anyone"), and seek the origin of, and explanation for .the evidence 
they have. This attitude of questioning, rather than dogmatic assertion, 
indicates more dearly than anything the difference between Books 1 and 2. 
Glaucon and Adeimantus have been released "by something quite 
divine" and have turned around to see, for the first time, something other 
than the shadows that everyone else is watching and quarrelling over. Yet 
they are dazzled, unsure of what it is they are seeing, and they beg Socrates 
for help as they start their journey up from the bottom of the cave. By this 
drastic difference in style between Books 1 and 2, Plato shows us 
dramatically and stylistically what he will repeat to us poetically and 
philosophically in Books 6 and 7: the difference in the nature of knowledge 
and understanding between those who dwell in eiKaaia, accepting the world 
and the opinions of the many at face value, and those who are released from 
this bondage and see what the true nature of the physical world is. The 
latter do not yet perceive reality, but now they know that the shadows on 
the wall of the cave are not reality, and they are open to further inquiry so 
that they may travel, perhaps, out of the cave to the contemplation of the 
Good. 
Glaucon is explicitly named by Adeimantus in Book 8 as the model of 
the Timocratic man, "as far as love of victory (<)>iXoviKia) goes" (548d). In 
Glaucon, "the part that loves victory and is spirited" (350b) predominates, 
and it is this spiritedness which causes him to rebel, and force the discussion 
to continue after Thrasymachus has acquiesced. 
As we have seen, the beginning of Book 2 coincides with the symbolic 
turning of Glaucon and Adeimantus away from the shadows on the wall, to 
face the fire and begin their journey upward in understanding. Thus, after 
the accounts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, when Socrates is persuaded to 
come to the aid of Justice, he says, "...the investigation we are undertaking is 
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no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply" (6$ pXerrovTos), in 
the same way as the philosopher, on returning to the cave and becoming 
used to its light once more, sees "infinitely better" than the prisoners (368c; 
520c). The rest of the dialogue is almost the exclusive property of Socrates, 
Glaucon, and Adeimantus; the others are present and listening to what is 
being said, but cannot join in, since their understanding does not reach so 
high. Throughout Books 2-4, the logical and intellectual atmosphere becomes 
more rarefied and abstract as the journey upward continues. Thus, the 
dialogue passes from the foundation of an ideal city (369ff) to the qualitites 
of its citizens (374ff), and their education (376ff), and eventually to the 
logical rigor of the Principle of Contradiction (436) and the three parts of the 
Soul (437-444). By the end of Book 4, Socrates has shown what Justice is, 
manifested in an individual and in a state. This is as far as he can take any 
explanation on the current intellectual level. In order to view Justice itself, 
without any physical appurtenances, a further degree of abstraction will be 
necessary. 
II. Books 5-7: The Upper Reaches of Reality 
The next great stylistic break occurs between Books 4 and 5, as we 
move from the world of substances and unreality to that of intangibles and 
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reality. We are prepared for this change near the end of Book 4, when 
Socrates has finished his delineation of the psyche and his establishment of 
the state, and he can now look back on the principle of Justice in the state as 
"some kind of phantom of Justice" (eiSwXov TI), which was useful in helping 
us ascend to our current level, but which we can now see for what it really 
was (443c). This leads very quickly to the beginning of Book 5, where Plato 
takes a great deal of trouble to emphasize that he is interrupting the main 
argument (so much trouble that, naturally, some scholars have speculated 
that Books 1(1) - 4 formed a separate, earlier work to which the rest was 
later added.1) Toward the end of Book 4 (435d), Socrates mentions a "longer 
road" necessary to get a precise grasp on the question (the phrase is 
repeated at the end of Book 6 (504b), in the conteit of the need for further 
precision). As Book 5 actually begins, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus re­
enter for the last time in the dialogue (449b, 450a), to interrupt explicitly 
the discourse which Socrates says he was about to start, and they join forces 
with Glaucon and Adeimantus to change the course of the discussion until 
Socrates returns to the same point at the beginning of Book 8 (543c), where 
he mentions again (in case anyone has forgotten) how he was interrupted, 
and what he was going to say. This interruption, separating off Books 5-7, is 
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made so obvious, and referred to so often, that it must fulfill some purpose 
in the dialogue. 
Up to the end of Book 4, Socrates has examined Justice in the visible 
world as it exists in the soul and in the state. In terms in of the Cave 
analogy, he has discussed the fire and the true nature of the objects which 
are paraded along in front of the fire. But now there must be some 
motivation for the companions of Socrates to continue on their upward 
journey toward Justice itself, just as something must drag the prisoner in the 
Cave along the rough upward way into the light of the sun. This motivation 
is €puis, and it is revealed when Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Adeimantus, 
and Glaucon all band together, demanding to have their curiosity about the 
communality of wives and children satisfied. This desire is the beginning of 
their search for the Good, as it is in the Symposium, where Diotima tells 
Socrates: 
... the right way to approach the things of love (T& epojTiKa), or 
to be led by another, is this: beginning from these beautiful 
things (Ta KaAd), to mount for that beauty's sake ever upwards, 
as by a flight of steps, from one to two, and from two to all 
beautiful bodies, and from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits 
and practices, and from practices to beautiful learnings, so that 
from learnings he may come at last to that perfect learning 
which is the learning solely of that beauty itself, and may know 
at last that which is the perfection of beauty. There in life and 
there alone... is life worth living for man, when he contemplates 
Beauty itself (OCUTO TO KCLAOV).2 
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The interruption of Books 5-7, motivated by eptos, gives us the 
definition of the true philosophers, the discussion of what really is, the 
Forms and the different levels of understanding, the Cave, and the detailed 
description of the continued education in the ideal state; all of these topics 
belong to the section of Socrates' Divided Line above mere TTICJTIS, and 
require this additional motivation for the interlocutors to follow them out of 
the realm of the the Cave, into the light of the Sun. 
III. Books 8-9: Climbing Back Down 
At the end of Book 7 we have finished the examination of the rarified 
entities existing without matter, situated on the upper segment of the Line, 
and Book 8 begins with another long dialogue which recalls the setting at the 
beginning of the detour in Books 5-7. This points out that we are resuming 
an earlier discussion at a lower level: we will now examine not Justice Itself, 
nor even how it is manifested in the ideal city, but the decay of that ideal 
and the consequent degeneration of the man who lives in it. As Socrates 
resumes his discussion, he speaks of the ruin and dissolution (<)>6opa, Xuais 
- 546a) of the ideal aristocracy he has founded, and then he playfully 
invokes the Muses. The major transition this clearly indicates was even 
noted by Adam, who remarks: 
Homer appeals to the Muses at the turning point of his 
narrative ... and Plato, like Milton ("Of man's first disobedience 
and the fruit Of that forbidden tree, sing heavenly Muse"), fitly 
invokes them at the commencement of his Epic of the Fall of 
Man.3 
Throughout Books 8 and 9, the emphasis of the content is on decay, as 
Socrates describes the states and individuals as increasingly worse and more 
wretched as they move farther and farther from his ideal Also, the form of 
the arguments returns to that of Books 2-4, with examples and deductions 
drawn from concrete tangible circumstances. Finally, Socrates proves that a 
tyranny and the tyrannic man are the most wretched of all states and men, 
especially if that type of man happens to head that type of state. 
The discussion of Book 10, and the indications that it reflects once 
more ciKaaia and the realm of the Cave, rightly belong in the following 
chapter, but the pattern emerging thus far is already clear enough to suggest 
with conviction that Plato wrote the Republic with a structure that is both 
cyclic and pyramidal, in effect, three-dimensional (see diagram below). Just 
as Socrates builds the ideal state in Books 2-4, so he traces its decay in Books 
8-9, and shows in parallel how man deteriorates in virtue and happiness 
until we reach the most wretched of men, the tyrant At the same time, the 
level of the discussion and the understanding required to participate in it 
rise in abstractness to the point at which Socrates tells Glaucon that they will 
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be able to comprehend no more than the offspring of TO ayaGov for now 
(506e); this is the apex of the pyramid, close to the center of the text of the 
Republic, and the level of the discussion descends from there. 
Levels of Understanding and 
of Logical Abstraction t6 &ya06v 
Books 5-7 
The Upper World 
Books 2-4 
The Ascent 
Book 1 
The Cave 
VOT]CriS 
6i&voia 
ir(<ms 
Books 8-9 
Degeneration 
eiKaaia Book 10 
Poetry 
* * •» 
Dramatic Movement of the Dialogue 
To see how inextricably this structure is bound up with the content of 
the Republic, imagine another Republic, containing the same material, 
written with equal artistry, and containing the same insights. This one, 
however, will be arranged differently. Proceeding directly from the end of 
Book 4 to the beginning of Book 8 without the notorious interruption, the 
genesis of the ideal state and its degeneration into the other four 
constitutions is completed before the interlocutors make the demand which 
provokes the present Books 5-7. This gives a very straightforward structure 
to the dialogue: beginning with the squabbling and inconclusive argument, it 
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rises through the mundane realms of politics to higher and higher realms of 
understanding until it terminates in the Forms and the contemplation of the 
Good (leaving out the "bothersome" Book 10, since it makes little sense 
anyway). At first glance, the construction of this version of the Republic 
would be just as good as Plato's version, possibly even more so, for beginning 
with the popular misconceptions of Justice, we move on to ideal Justice in the 
individual and state, and finally a vision of Justice Itself, and beyond that. 
The Good - just as in the Divine Comedy Dante takes us from the depths of 
Hell to the empyrean, and ends with a vision of the "Eternal Good" and 
"universal form".4 But Plato's vision is not a Christian allegory ending in an 
eternal other world, and to arrange the Republic in this way would suggest 
one fundamental change in the meaning of the simile of the Cave: the 
philosopher would not be expected to return to the Cave. This however, is 
contrary to Socrates' repeated intentions in the Republic: 
Then our job as founders," I said, "is to compel the best natures 
... to see the good and to go up that ascent, and ... not to permit 
them what is now permitted." 
"What's that?" 
To remain there," 1 said, "and not be willing to go down again 
among the prisoners or share their labors and honors, whether 
they be slighter or more serious."' 
The "great interruption" of Book 5-7 is explicable if we see it as part of 
the allegorical journey of the philosopher. Beginning with the images on the 
wall of the Give (Book 1), we turn around (beginning of Book 2), see the Fire, 
and begin our ascent to the surface (Books 2-4), but we cannot remain in our 
contemplative rapture there (Books 5-7), and must go back down and do our 
duty, to help the prisoners in the Cave. This corresponds to the structure of 
the Republic as we have it, and the constant references in Books 8 and 9 to 
decay and dissolution6 reinforce the impression that we are headed down 
into less wholesome regions than those we were just discussing. At each 
major turning point of the Republic, we have seen how Plato indicates 
dramatically that the philosophical content of the dialogue is changing. By 
the end of Book 9, we have ascended to the sunlight and returned to the 
Cave, amid the destruction, corruption, madness, and unreality of the 
tyrannical state. Our discussion has risen from misconceptions to idealized 
actualities (states) to abstractions (the arguments on the soul) to pure forms, 
and has descended back among concrete actualities (degenerate states); 
ending in a tyranny. We are now ready to grope back among its physical 
and intellectual prisoners. 
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Chapter Four; 
Poetry and the Meaning r>f Rnolf 1 n 
We have seen that the Republic portrays a vigorous rational attempt 
on the part of Socrates to woo Glaucon and Adeimantus away from tyranny 
to philosophy by showing them what true Justice is. The Republic is also an 
allegory, showing the journey of the philosopher by means of the imagery of 
the Cave. When we reach the beginning of Book 10 it seems that there is 
little left to say, if we think that the Republic is merely an expository 
treatise on Justice, and it seems that Plato has indeed said little worth 
noticing in his last book, doing us a disservice with this "lame and messy 
ending".1 If we look at Book 10 in a different light, however, we will find 
that Plato is accomplishing several goals here. 
Criticisms of Book 10 fall into three categories: criticisms of its form 
("a ragbag"2), its content ("gratuitous and clumsy..Iull of oddities"*), or its 
placement ("an appendix"4). If the interpretation of the Republic as a 
structure corresponding to the Divided Line and the Cave is correct, this 
interpretation should be able to solve some of these difficulties. Still, as in 
the case of Book 1, all of these criticisms have some grounds in the text. At 
first glance, structure appears to be almost lacking in Book 10, with 
succeeding sections on the place of poetry in the nature of reality, the effects 
of poetry on the soul, the immortality of the soul, and the Myth of Er. The 
topics which Socrates discusses, and the casual, offhand manner in which he 
shifts from one to another of them, contrast strongly with the careful 
preparation and intricate interweaving of subjects which seems to occur in 
the proceeding books. Also, the arguments themselves come under intense 
criticism, especially the "proof" of the immortality of the soul: "This is one of 
the few really embarrassingly bad arguments in Plato..."', These difficulties 
are serious, and possibly fatal..."6, 'Plato does not see, or is unmoved by, the 
question-begging nature of this argument..."7. Aside from the arguments, the 
content itself seems to differ from the rest of the Republic: the nature of the 
soul, of poetry, and of the Forms are discussed in terms which seem 
fundamentally different than the previous books. Books 4-9, for instance, 
employ a tripartite soul, corresponding with the classes in the city, while 
Book 10 seems to suppose either a unitary or a bipartite soul.8 In Books 2-3, 
some poetry is imitative but can still be put to use; in Book 10, however, all 
imitative poetry should be banished. Finally, the Forms in Books 5-7 are 
described in a different fashion, or used toward a different end, than in Book 
10. In the earlier books they are employed in metaphysical and 
epistemelogical contexts, and appear to be derived by the "Argument from 
Opposites",9 while in Book 10 their usage seems to indicate that they are 
simply being employed as universais, derived by the "One over Many" 
argument18 
It cannot be denied that Book 10 exhibits variances from the rest of 
the Republic which are readily pointed out, but once again, if a doctrinal 
explanation is lacking for what we read in the book, perhaps we should look 
for a dramatic one instead. It will be the argument of this Chapter that the 
content format, and placement of Book 10 are deliberate, and are intended 
to show the methods the philosopher must use on his return to the Cave, and 
the main obstacles he will face in attempting to work with its prisoners. 
Also, the level of understanding being addressed in this book is no longer 
that of the potential philosopher like Glaucon and Adeimantus, but that of 
those with no potential for philsophy. 
It will first be argued that the discussion returns to the Cave in Book 
10. In light of this knowledge, the topics of the book and the manner of 
their presentation will be discussed. Since Book 10 does not include the 
same variety of speakers as Book 1 does, we cannot look to differences in 
viewpoint to help with interpretation, and must rely essentially on what 
Socrates is saying to Glaucon. Yet this lack of interlocutors will help us also, 
\ 
since we will have no need to debate what Socrates' position really is; he 
tells it to us directly, just as he has told us for the past eight books. As in the 
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case of Book 1, we will see how the foregoing structure of the Republic has 
prepared us for the meaning to be found in Book 10. 
I. The Return to the Cave 
The examination of Books 1-9 has shown how Plato, at critical points 
in the dialogue, gives clear indications that the level of the discussion (with 
reference to the analogy of the Cave, and the understanding required to 
follow this discussion, is changing. The opening of Book 10 demonstrates this 
principle once more, albeit on a more modest scale than in Book 1. Close to 
the beginning of Book 10 (595c), Socrates and Giaucon have an exchange 
which is unusual, in that it is more jocose and informal than the majority of 
the discussions we have been following since Book 2: 
"Could you tell me what imitation in general is? For I myself 
scarcely comprehend what it wants to be." 
"Then I," he said, "of course will comprehend it." 
This sarcasm is unusual, therefore drawing attention to itself, and 
Socrates immediately follows it with a direct reference to the Cave (596a): 
'That wouldn't be anything strange," I said, "since men with 
duller vision have often, you know, seen things before those 
who see more sharply (o^uTcpov pxerrovnuv)." 
This statement is absurd on the face of it, and can only make sense 
when viewed as corresponding to the return of the philosopher to the Cave 
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with his "maimed" eyes. It is also an exact echo of Book 2 (368c), where 
Socrates, just beginning to converse with Glaucon and Adeimantus, had told 
them that "...the investigation we are undertaking is no ordinary thing, but 
one for a man who sees sharply" (o£i) (JXeirovTos). The statement in Book 2 
was made when Socrates was just beginning to lead the two brothers out of 
the Cave, and he mentions it again now that they are returning to it, showing 
that this "sharp sight", which was a prerequisite for the bulk of their 
investigation, now may actually hinder their inquiry. The only situation in 
which Socrates has acknowledged that the philosopher may be at a 
disadvantage is on his initial return to the Cave (516e-517a): 
"If such a man were to come down (K<rra0ds) again and sit in 
the same seat, on coming suddenly from the sun wouldn't his 
eyes get infected with darkness?" 
"Very much so," he said. 
"And if he once more had to compete with those perpetual 
prisoners in forming judgements about those shadows while his 
vision was dim, before his eyes recovered, and if the time 
needed for getting accustomed were not at all short, wouldn't he 
be the source of laughter, and wouldn't it be said of him that he 
went up and came back with his eyes corrupted, and that it's 
not even worth trying to go up?" 
Socrates' joking allusion at the beginning of Book 10 clearly indicates 
that we are to consider the dialogue descending through those levels once 
more. The connection between the Cave and Book 10 becomes even closer 
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when we examine what has been said just before this playful exchange with 
Glaucon, and recall the comparison of "sight" to "thought" which is expounded 
in the analogy of the Sun in Book 6 (507ff.). 
Throughout Book 9, the type of state and man discussed has become 
worse and worse, ending with the tyrant, and as soon as Book 10 begins, 
Socrates begins speaking again of poetry - imitative poetry in particular. 
This should lead us to suspect that poetry will play an important, if not 
pivotal role in this book, and Socrates does say almost immediately 
thereafter, "all such things (imitative poetry) seem to maim the thought (or 
understanding: Siavoia) of those who do not have, as a remedy, knowledge 
of how they really are" (593b 9-10). Taken in the context of our re-entry of 
the Cave, this seems to indicate that poetry is a very powerful force on this 
level. Just as those coming out of the sunlight are unable to see in the 
darkness of the Cave until their eyes adjust to the reduced light, so the 
philosopher, newly come from seeing things in the world of Reality, is 
temporarily unable to think dearly about issues which are of great import in 
the world of the senses. This implies the relationships Poetry : Mind :: 
Darkness: Eyes. Socrates had said in Book 7 that the philosopher who tries 
to deal with shadows in the Cave will be confused until his eyes adjust to the 
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weak and uncertain light, and now he says that in dealing with imitation, the 
essence oT eiicaaia, he (Socrates) will be at a disadvantage. 
Socrates goes still further: six times in Book 10 he refers to poets as 
the makers or imitators of a "phantom" (ei&uXov)11. In describing the 
return of the Philosopher to the Cave in Book 7, he had said: 
"And, in getting habituated to (the Cave], you will see ten 
thousand times better than the men there, and you'll know 
what each of the phantoms (ei&oXa) is, and oT what it is a 
phantom UI&DXOV), because you have seen the truth about fair, 
just, and good things." (520c) 
And a little further on: 
'Then", I said, "the release from bonds and the turning around 
from shadows & the phantoms Ui&uXa) and the light, the way 
up from the cave to the sun; and, once there, the persisting 
inability to look at the animals and plants and the sun's light, 
and looking instead at the divine appearances in water and at 
shadows of the things that «/**, rather than as before at 
shadows of phantoms Ui&oXa) cast by a light that, when 
judged in comparison with the sun, also has the character of a 
phantom (eiSuiXov)..." (532b-c) 
These passages dearly indicate that poetry is akin to the cutouts 
which create the shadows of the Cave. One implication is clear: we have 
returned to the Cave. There is another which follows from this: poetry, more 
than anything else in the realm of eixaaia, is the force which the 
philosopher must contend with, both in continuing to live the philosophic 
life, and in attempting to aid the inhabitants of the Cave to start on the road 
V 
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to philosophy, as we have been watching Socrates do throughout the 
Republic. 
11. The Structure. Placement, and Content of Book 10 
Now that we have seen that Book 10 has indeed returned to the Cave, 
we must use this knowledge to explain the structure, placement, and content 
of the book, all of which have been criticized, as we have seen. Although the 
reason for all three is the same, the separate examination of each will better 
show how they are deliberately and artistically placed to form a fitting 
conclusion to a great work. 
The structure of Book 10 must involve poetry, since poetry is its main 
subject. Bloom's comment is apt: 
Book 10 begins with a criticism of Homeric poetry and ends 
with an example of Socratic poetry. Separating the two is a 
discussion of the immortality of the soul. The difference 
between the old poetry and the new lies in their understanding 
of the soul; the old poetry seems to lead necessarily to a view of 
the soul which is inimical to philosophy.... Socrates outlines a 
new kind of poetry which leads beyond itself, which does not 
present man's only alternatives as tragic or comic, which 
supports the philosophic life.12 
In other words, Socrates is continuing to assist his listeners, but 
instead of refining and correcting their beliefs, as he did in Book 1, he is 
trying here to change the way they see their place in the world. The old 
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type of poetry required a passive listener, who would merely absorb what 
he heard; the new Socratic poetry provokes its listener and compels him to 
think, to question, and to become a part or the "poem" himself, by thinking 
through what he hears, debating it, and at times objecting to it Homeric 
poetry showed men as the puppets of the gods; Socratic poetry shows them 
as masters of their own fate. The structure of Book 10 brings out this 
contrast by showing that a philosopher cannot allow himself to succumb to 
the charms of Homer; he must put aside these childish things and 
concentrate on the well-being of his soul, that is, on the pursuit of 
philosophy. (One is reminded of Jerome trying to put aside Gcero so that he 
can immerse himself in Scripture). Far from being a haphazard pot-pourri. 
Book 10 is deliberately constructed so as to raise the mental horizons of its 
readers and exhort them once more, in a slightly different fashion from 
Books 2-9, to pursue the philosophic life. 
The placement of Book 10 is the culmination of the long process of 
building the overall structure of the Republic. Rather than being an 
appendix or afterthought, it is the fitting conclusion to the journey which we 
have seen on three separate levels: physically, in the descent of Socrates 
from Athens to the Piraeus, philosophically, in the text of the dialogue, and 
allegoricaily, in the simile of the Cave. With this structure, the Republic 
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would be incomplete if it did not return to its lowest level, and leave us in 
the Cave. By doing so, Plato reminds us once more that the philosopher must 
return to the Cave and sit down with its prisoners. Ending Book 10 in this 
way completes both the ring structure and the three-dimensional shape. Its 
placement at the end of the Republic is therefore essential. 
But what of the content of Book 10? If Plato had nothing worthwhile 
to say after Book 9, the completion of the structure would be a poor eicuse 
to continue on for another 26 Stephanus pages. What we have seen of the 
structure and placement of the book allows us to guess that the content will 
follow the same pattern: a further appeal to the audience, on a different 
level of comprehension, to pursue the philosophic life. Even a casual 
examination of Book 10 will reveal that poetry is the main topic of the book, 
either in the various criticisms of it by Socrates, or in the new "Socratic" 
poetry of the Myth of Er.. Why renew the discussion of poetry after the 
original discourse over its place in the ideal state? Again, let us look to the 
situation in which Plato has placed his characters. We have seen the Forms, 
and ideal Justice manifested in the state and in the individual, but now we 
have returned to the Cave, and soon Socrates must go back up to the city, 
and we must put down the Republic and live once more in the "real" world. 
Book 1 has shown us the "normal" types of people we will have to deal with, 
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and how desperate is the need for a true understanding of Justice among 
them (though they may not even know it): how can we keep the vision of the 
Republic pure in such a world, and continue on the path of philosophy for as 
long as possible? To rephrase the question in the terms which Plato may 
well have seen it: what is the greatest threat to the philosophic life? The 
return to the Cave in Book 10 allows Plato to give the answer: imiutive 
poetry. 
Since education in Athens before the Sophists "consisted of learning by 
heart the works of the poets" ** once one had learned basic reading, writing, 
and arithmetic, poetry held a position in Classical Greece very different from 
anything comparable today.14 Considering its position in Greek life and 
education at this point in history, we can say that, using the imagery of the 
Cave, poetry is the creation of the axonr), or artifacts, by means of whose 
shadows the prisoners obtain such knowledge as they have, and the ones 
who carry these artifacts back and rorth in front of the fire, some uttering 
sounds and others not, must be the poets or "makers", some of whom speak 
or write, while the others merely create in silence (painting, sculpture, 
bronze work, etc.) If this is true, and Socrates is now back at their level, 
trying to communicate of the reality of Justice in terms that the 
prisoners will understand, then it is clear that he will have to employ poetry 
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for that purpose. He cannot simply run up and down, "forcing" people to 
turn around, face the fire, and begin an ascent to the surface; Book 1 shoved 
how difficult it was for Socrates to tell people that their basic beliefs are 
false or incorrect., and the references there to his seizure and trial remind us 
that he was eventually killed for trying to attempt even the modest amount 
of "correction" which we saw exemplified in Book 1. Instead, those who have 
true potential for philosophy must themselves make the effort to see beyond 
the conventions and misconceptions of their day, turning to the fire of their 
own accord, as did Glaucon and Adeimantus. 
We saw that in Book 1 Socrates could only speak to his interlocutors in 
terms which they could understand; therefore, the best which he could do 
was to correct their deficiencies with either homely examples or Sophistic 
tricks. Now, in Book 10, he is speaking to the same group once more: those 
who are unable to pursue the love of wisdom. White acknowledges this 
change in the intended audience: 
...the argument of Books 2-9 as a whole may be thought of as 
addressed to those who have the potential to be philosopher-
rulers, and who have some ability, though incomplete (506b-
507a), to understand the notion of the Good. This interpretation 
would also explain the role of Book 10 in the economy of the 
work. For that book would turn out to be addressed to those 
not addressed in Book 2-9, that is, to those without the capacity 
to understand the philosophical concepts involved in them. ... 
This isjtot, however, to deny that Plato believes much of the 
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content of these arguments, but only to deny that he thinks that 
they have full rigor and cogency.1' 
The content of Book 10 must, therefore, be seen in this context: 
whatever it is that Plato is saying here, he is saying it in a different dramatic 
and philosophical setting. His sole interlocutor in Book 10, Glaucon, is 
standing in for all those who will not be philosophers. 
The first section of Book 10 discusses several aspects of poetry and 
imitation which are, needless to say, controversial. It dwells on the 
condemnation of the imitation of an object as third in line from the reality of 
the object's Form, the complaint that poets have never really accomplished 
anything concrete, the drawing of a distinction between using, making, and 
imitating an object, and the examination of the effects of imitation on one's 
soul. Does this section reveal Plato's actual views, or not? Are the 
arguments to be taken seriously? If we take into account the dramatic 
situation at the beginning of Book 10, and accept the idea that Plato is 
speaking to a different audience here than in the books just ended, and 
speaking to them on their own terms, then one thing becomes clear: Book 10, 
as might be expected from the ring pattern of the Republic's composition, is 
very similar to Book 1, since the setting (the Cave) is the same, and the 
people addressed in it (prisoners in darkness) are the same. Therefore, the 
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answers to the questions we asked above concerning Plato's true intentions 
may very well be the sam4, also. 
In Book 1, the statements which Plato apparently believed he put in 
the mouth of Socrates, although in some cases he did not argue very 
convincingly for them, but the reason why he did not write into the Republic 
the objections to these arguments which some of his later critics wish that he 
had is that those statements fulfilled a dramatic purpose, rather than a 
philosophic one. Here in Book 10 the same is true: Plato obviously feels 
very strongly that imitative poetry is not a good educator; in fact it is 
dangerous to education and philosophy, and only a willful misreading of the 
text can claim otherwise. He is, therefore, perfectly serious in his opposition 
to imitation. In Book 3, he had allowed the imitation of one who was KOAOS 
xdyaOos (396b), simply because his audience was able to understand the 
context in which he was speaking and the restrictions under which he was 
placing this kind of imitation, but for his present audience in Book 10 the 
differences between the types of objects imitated, and the reasons for the 
difference in treatment for the various kinds of imitation, are beyond 
understanding with a simple slogan or formula, and therefore it is best for 
Plato simply to assert that imitative poetry is bad under any circumstances, 
and list several "proofs" in support of the assertion. These "proofs" or 
81 
arguments are not, therefore, to be taken as Plato's definitive 
demonstrations on the subject; he is not interested here in building an 
ironclad demonstration for another philosopher. Rather, his purpose is to 
dissuade the layman from placing any faith in the extravagant claims made 
for poetry by giving four different reasons for avoiding poetry altogether. 
These reasons may fail to satisfy, but we must remember the context 
in which they occur; anything more complex would not convince, or be 
understood by, his intended audience. Indeed, these "proofs", in their 
philosophical deficiencies, betray the kind of weaknesses to which a 
beginner would be prone, demonstrating that in their formal logic they have 
returned to elicaaCa and the intellectual level of the Cave. By examining 
these arguments, we can see how they perform a two-fold function: while 
their deficiencies show that the intellectual level of the dialogue has 
returned to the Cave, they have been constructed in such a way as to further 
the purpose of Book 10 once more, by inciting the reader himself to think 
more deeply on the issues raised. 
In the first argument (596a-598d), the use of "bed", a physical, 
manufactured article, as an example of a Form is inept and misleading,16 and 
some evidence exists which suggests that this was never a tenet of Plato or 
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the Academy.17 Also, the suggestion that "a god" made the Form (597b) 
brings a jarring element of theology into a scheme in which theology has 
been conspicuously absent until now. Theology had no part in the 
metaphysics of Book 6, but it certainly hearkens back to the religious views 
of Cephalus and those described by Adeimantus in Book 2,. in which the gods 
act by fancy or compulsion. Yet beyond this, the attempt to place "bed" on 
the Divided Line is certainly ludicrous,18 but makes sense if interpreted 
paedogogically, since the attempt will force the analyzation of "bed" into its 
simplest material and geometrical components, which £&& be placed on the 
Line. In attempting to place "bed" on the Line, the reader will thus rethink 
what Form is, and come to his own formal definition of "bed". As Guthrie 
says: 
"The beds make Plato's three-tiered ontology absolutely clear ... 
and we should not, on the strength of this passage alone, decide 
that Plato believed in transcendent Forms of manufactured 
objects." w 
The argument which says that poetry should be banished, because it 
appeals to the basest part of the soul, has a similar purpose. Since this 
section assumes a soul with a bipartite structure, it is unmistakably at odds 
with the description of the soul in Book 4.20 The soul still has its reasoning 
part, TO XoyiciTiKov (602e), but it also has a second part to which various 
names are applied21 This second part sometimes appears as the 
emeupryriKOV (606a-b), and sometimes as a degenerate form of the 
©u^oeiSes (603a, 605c), exactly the sort of confused composite which the 
prisoners in the Cave might make22 Yet this misconception once more 
points the way toward the light for those who wish to seek it; the confused 
second part of the soul has the same two aspects which have already been 
separated out and explained in Book 4. The reader who recalls this, and 
recognizes the discrepancy, will re-read the argument in Book 4, and realize 
that those aspects of poetry which gratify the lowest part of the soul may be 
worthless, but those which gratify and strengthen the middle may be 
beneficial, and the person who has thought sufficiently on this question to 
make that distinction is the person who can safely read imitative poetry. 
The middle part of Book 10, the discussion of the immortality of the 
soul, is similar to the just-completed section on poetry: it is introduced in a 
seemingly flippant manner (608d), and the argument itself is "far-from-
cogent"2 ,̂ "an ellipse"24, or just plain "embarrassingly bad"2). Once again, we 
have Plato writing arguments which seem to do him great discredit, but the 
solution to the dilemma is once more dramatic. As in the previous section on 
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poetry, Plato has a point to make: he wants us to think about the soul, and to 
think of it as immortal. The arguments he uses here are onoe again very 
concrete and elementary: 
Good and bad exist, and the Bad destroys and corrupts everything, 
while the Good saves and benefits. (608d-e) 
There is an Evil or Illness which is the Bad for each thing. (609a-b) 
If the particular Evil for a thing does not destroy it, that thing is 
indestructible by nature. (609b) 
Disease destroys the body, but vice does not destroy the soul, 
therefore the soul must be immortal. (609c-610e) 
These arguments fulfill two functions: first, they focus the reader's 
attention on the soul and immortality, widening his perspective and 
persuading him to think in more expansive terms. Second, as with the 
arguments in Book 1 and in this book concerning poetry, it is the most 
important subjects which seem to claim the most objectionable proofs, a sign 
that perhaps Plato knew that anyone with some interest in philosophy would 
be inclined to elbow Glaucon out or the way and say "Absolutely not!" to one 
of Socrates's questions. This shows once more that the primary purpose of 
the dialogue is to incite, as well as to instruct, and in the Republic, the topics 
on which Plato wishes to provoke the greatest debate are Justice, Poetry, and 
the Soul (and he has succeeded admirably). 
Finally, this "proof" of the immortality of the soul is very conspicuous, 
both in its placement and its content. It is the last argument in the Republic. 
and, by popular acclaim, it is the worst Yet the way in which it is 
introduced warns us explicitly that it is not necessarily to be taken as a proof 
which the seasoned philosopher would construct, but one which a beginning 
philosopher could construct: 
"Haven't you perceived," I said," that our soul is immortal and 
is never destroyed?" 
And he looked me in the face with wonder and said, "No, by 
Zeus, I haven t. Can you say that?" 
"If I am not to do an injustice," I said. "And 1 suppose you can 
too, for its nothing hard." (608d) 
The proof begins with, and relies on, the premise that the soul is 
simple and indestructible by most familiar means; this unitary nature 
clashes both with the tripartite soul of Book 4 and with the bipartite soul in 
the section of Book 10 just discussed. Therefore, not only is the argument 
bad, but its premises contradict those employed just previous to it; this is 
just the sort of aloppiness one would expect from a beginner (and we have 
been told directly that Glaucon could construct this proof). Yet the 
conclusion (61 lb-d) strongly contends that the true nature of the soul must 
be simple, a conclusion which alludes to the much more detailed proofs in 
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the Phaedo which rest chiefly on the same premise. The proof, then, once 
again forces the attentive reader to confront the problem of the conflicting 
natures of the soul, and, by its stress on its unitary nature, to return to the 
logic of the Phaedo and contemplate its reasoning further.26 
The Myth of Er is the final part of Book 10, and even without having 
read it, one would expect that it must be one of the most important parts of 
the Republic, something for Plato to leave as a memorable conclusion to this 
magnum QDUS. It is indeed, summing up many of the main tenets of the 
work in symbolic form, yet many commentators devote far less space to it 
than the rest of the book.27 The reason for this imbalance can perhaps be 
explained by quoting Annas's comments on the Myth: 
The Myth of Er is a painful shock; its vulgarity seems to pull us 
right down to the level of Gephalus, where you take justice 
seriously when you start thinking about hell-fire. It is not only 
that the childishness of the myth jars; if we take it seriously, it 
seems to offer us an entirety consequentialist reason for being 
just, thus undermining Plato's sustained effort to show that 
justice is worth having for the agent in a non-consequentialist 
way.2® 
These comments are a clear warning of the inherent danger in 
ignoring the literary side of a Platonic dialogue. First, based on the 
examination of Book 1, Gephalus's understanding is nothing to disparage; 
Plato has shown that he possesses right opinion, even if it is only a guess, 
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and Socrates tries merely to correct his opinion, not criticize it. Second, is the 
Myth of Er in fact just another variation on the stories of "hell-fire"? The 
"standard" account oT Hades is the Odyssey. Book 11, in which Odysseus is 
told that all mortals come to the same end: fleshless ghosts, who cannot 
speak to Odysseus until they drink from the blood he has placed in a pit for 
them (XI, 218-222). In this account, the lives which they led had nothing to 
do with their present condition, although other descriptions of an afterlife 
befitting the type of life led (Elysium or the Isles of the Blest) were also 
current, even within Homer (Odyssey. IV, 561-569). In contrast, the souls 
which Er meets seem very much like humans; they set up camps, greet each 
other, tell stories, lament or rejoice, journey to different places, and finally 
drink the waters of the Lethe and fall asleep.2? But the most important 
differences are the rewarding or punishing of souls newly dead, according to 
their just-completed lives, and the choosing of their next lives by the souls 
just completing their thousand-year sojourns.'0 Therefore, although the 
setting for the Myth is generally the same as that of Hades, it contains very 
important differences which, far from "offering an entirely consequentialist 
reason for being just"'1, does just the opposite, if we can only look at it in 
light of the philosopher's problem of reaching the prisoners in the Cave 
through the shadows on the wall. Just after the section of the Myth in which 
Socrates tells how the souls choose their lots for their next lives, he turns to 
Glaucon and makes a passionate appeal to him (6l8b-619a) to follow the 
philosophic life, since it alone enables us to see reality, and to make the 
choices in our lives which allow us to live virtuously and happily, based on 
the knowledge of that reality. The main emphasis throughout the myth is on 
the choices that the souls make, the need for training to make those choices 
correctly, and the result that the responsibility for the choices made, and the 
effects which follow from them, are on the head of the individual making 
them and no one else. Is it not clear then that the Myth of Er is the eiioov of 
the Republic, the shadow of the journey which Glaucon and Adeimantus have 
just taken with Socrates, but narrated so as to correspond to the level of 
understanding which the inhabitants of the Cave possess? Book 1 has shown 
us that very few people, even good people, can follow the vision of the 
Republic: shall we leave them chained to the wall, then? No, for the 
philosopher is compelled to return to the Cave in order to share their labors 
and honors, something which Plato shows us Socrates doing throughout the 
Republic. Socrates works to turn to the philosophic life those who are able, 
but for those who are not, he does give a bit of poetry, the essence of which 
corresponds to that of the Republic as a whole. The Myth of Er is then the 
allegory of the Republic itself: one man, having gained privileged information 
from another plane of existence, returns to tell others what he has learned 
about Justice, so that the others may live more justly in their present life, 
and the substance of the message with which he returns is the same in both 
accounts: you determine the Justice or Injustice of your own life by the 
choices which you make; the pursuit of philosophy better prepares you to 
make those choices; and the Justice or Injustice of the choices carry their 
own rewards or punishments, aside from other consequences. The Myth of 
Er is poetry, told to appeal to the understanding of the inhabitants of the 
lowest level of the Cave and to their delight in cfooves, but it also contains a 
powerful statement of the individual's responsibility for the choice of his 
own character, and thus his own virtue and happiness. The climax of the 
myth, stripped of its context, could serve as the key to the entire Republic. 
just as well as any of the statements from the central books: "Virtue is 
without a master. As each man honors or dishonors her, he will have more 
or less of her. The blame is his who chooses; god is blameless.".'2 Could 
anything be farther from the popular belief, narrated by Adeimantus in 
Book 2 (364a-e), that the gods send fortune or misfortune based on the 
sacrifices and incantations one has offered? The Myth of Er is written to 
approximate the popular beliefs or Hades closely enough that most people 
will read it in that context, but the differences are there, and for those with 
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discrimination, these differences spell out what Plato thinks we must do in 
order to "fare well". As with all methods of communication in the Cave, it is 
not the truth, but it is the means by which we can be incited or inspired to 
seek the truth. 
In retrospect, Book 10 is a fitting conclusion to the Republic, one that 
has been amply prepared for, and one which accomplishes several things at 
once. First, it completes the symbolic journey of the philosopher by 
returning us to the Cave and its prisoners. Second, it shows us how the 
philosopher must deal with the prisoners, by using a new type of poetry, 
since nothing else will work in the Cave. The new poetry is didactic, 
imitating reality rather than shadows, and it encourages them to pursue 
philosophy, rather than the aimless gratification of the lower parts of the 
soul. Third, the book completes the defense of Justice on a different level of 
comprehension, by demonstrating poetically, through the Myth of Er, the 
points which he has been making philosophically throughout the rest of the 
Republic: the just life is best in and of itself, and the just life is best 
achieved by the pursuit of wisdom. Rather than being "a lame and messy 
ending", Book 10 skillfully draws the numerous strands of Plato's thought 
together and ends the work with an inspiring summation of the whole. 
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The virtues of Books 2-9 of the Republic have long been acknowledged 
and applauded. This thesis has attempted to show that Books 1 and 10 also 
have their place in the work, and that, far from being afterthoughts or 
leftovers, Plato has lavished as much attention and artistry on them as on 
their more-appreciated companions. It is the function of Books 1 and 10 
which gives them their place in the structure of the Republic, rather than the 
relative strengths or weaknesses of their "content" or arguments, vis-a-vis 
Books 2-9. When viewed in the light of this overall strucutre, the Republic 
becomes a more impressive and unified work, in which "most readers ... are 
convinced that from the initial KcrrefJTiv to the final d5 TrpdrTUj^v, 
Plato has completely mastered all problems of organization; that he has said 
all that he wanted to say in just the way he wanted to say it."" 
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Notes for Chapter 4 
1. Annas, p. 353. 
2. Annas, p. 335. 
3. Annas, p. 335. 
4. White, p. 246. 
5. Annas, p.345. 
6. Adam, II, p. 423, n. 25. 
7. Annas, p. 346. 
8. The section on the effect of imitation on the soul (603a-606d) speak 
of the "calculating" part (602e) or the "best" part (603a, 604d), and a 
part "opposed to it" (603a), which is called several things: "ordinary" 
(603a), "irrational" (604d), "mournful" (606a), and "laughing" (606c). 
The discussion of the immortality of the soul, on the other hand, 
assumes that the true nature of the soul does not contain variety or 
dissimilarity (61 la-d). 
9. Annas, p. 209. 
10. Cf. Aristotle, Nich. Eth.. 1095a25-30. 
11.598b, 599a, 599d, 600e, 601b, 605c. 
12. Bloom, p. 427-428. 
13. "Education", The Oiford Classical Dictionary, p. 370 
14. See especially Havelock, Chapters 3 and 4: 'Poetry as Preserved 
Communication", and The Homeric Encyclopedia". 
15. White, p. 52. 
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16. See especially Adam, II, p. 387. 
17. Aristotle, Metaphysics. A 991b3, and A 1070al8, and Proclus, la 
TM, 10411. 
18. Because a bed is composed of simpler Forms ("wood", "cloth", etc.), 
which are in turn composed of even simpler Forms, in various 
quantities and relations, which are themselves Forms with places on 
the Line. 
19. Guthrie, IV, p. 548. 
20. Adam, II, p. 406. 
21. See note 8 above. 
22. Adam, II, p. 406. He notes that the one part has two aspects, and 
the second part is described as having a "quasi-intellectual power." 
23. White, p. 259. 
24. Adam, II. p. 422 n. 
25. Annas, p. 345. 
26. See especially Adam, II, p. 427. 
27. White, for example, devotes 16 pases to the rest of the book, and 
just over 2 pages to the Myth of Er. Annas devotes over 14 pages to 
the rest of the book, and 4 to the Myth. 
28. Annas, p. 349. 
29.6l4e-6l5a, 616b, 620d-621b. 
30.615a-616a, 617d-6l8b. 
31. Annas, p. 349. 
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32. (67le). aperri 8e aSecnroTov, fjv Tifjucuv Kai <rrî d£wv irXeov Kai 
eXarrov auTqs eKacrros e£ei. aiTia eXo^evoir 0eos avaiTios 
33. Sider, p. 336. 
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Appendix 1 
Running of the Phaedo 
EX. AUTOS, $ 4>ai8ajv, Trapeyevou IWKPATEI EKEIVQ TFJ fpepqt 5 TO 
(|>dppXXKOV €TTL€V €V Tip 8eCTpfl)TT)pUp, f) OXXOU TOU TjKOUCJaS; 
4>AIA. AUTOS, ffi "Ex&paTes. 
EX. TI o5v ©rj ecrnv frrra elirev o avfjp irpo TOU ©avcrrou; Kaimus 
ereXeuTa; T|8eius yap av eyu) aKOuaaiiw. Kai yap OUTC ̂ Xeiaauuv 
ou8eis Travu TI emxtopiaCei Ta vuv 'Ae^vaCe, OUTC TIS £evos a<J>iKTai 
Xpovou CTUXVOO eK€i0€v ocTTis av T)\xiv oafyes TI ayyeiXai olos T fjv Trepi 
TOUTIOV, TTXT^V ye 8f| OTI (jxipiMKOV TTLQJV crrroedvoi- TWV 8e aXXuiv ouSev 
eTx^v <|>pd££iv. 
4>AIA. Ou8e Ta Trepi Trjs 8uais apa eirueeaee ov Tpo-rrov eyeveTO; 
EX. Nai, TauTa ytev Tpiv TjyyeiXe TIS, Kai e0aupuiCo^€v ye OTI TTaXai 
yevoptevnrjs auTrjs iroXXip ucrrepov <J>aiveTai aiTO0ava)v. T£ o5v TOUTO, 
ti) $ai8u)v; 
4>AIA. TUXT) TIS auT$, u) >Ex^KPaT€5, auvlpT)- hy^ev yap r§ irpoTepaig 
TT)S 8(KT)S T| iTpu|JU>a eaTe^vr) TOU TTXOIOU o eis AfjXov 'A0T)vaioi 
neprrouaiv. 
EX. TOUTO 8e 8f| TI ecrnv; 
$AIA. TOUT' ecrri TO TTXOIOV, UJS (JXXCTIV 'A0T)vaioi, ev $ ©rjaeus iroTe eis 
Kpf)TT)v TOUS 8is eirra eKeivous (pxeTO aytov Kai eoioae Te Kai OUTOS 
EAIUOT). TIP ofiv 'ATTOXXIDVI T$£AVTO ibs XeyeTai TOT€, ei auQeiev, 
EKAATOU CTOUS 0eiopiav arrd^eiv eis AT^XOV fjv Srj aei Kai vuv ITI e| 
€Keivou KOT eviauTov Tip 0eq> TTe^trouaiv. eiTeiSav o5v ap£u)VTai rfjs 
Gewpias, VOJAOS ecrriv OUTOIS ev Tip xpovtp TOUTIP Ka0apeueiv rqv TTOXIV 
Kai SRIPLOAIG. PNRJSEVA arroKTeivuvai, irpiv av eis AflXov TE a<|>iKT)Tai TO 
TTXOIOV Kai TTOXIV 8eupo- TOUTO 8* evioTe ev TTOXX$ xpo^p yCyveTai, 
OTav TUXUIAIV avejioi auoXapovTes OUTOUS. apXT) 8' EATI TT)S Qeiupias 
eireiSav o iepeus TOU 'ATTOXXWVOS CRREIJNQ TT|V Trpu|ivav TOU TTXOIOU-
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TOVTO 8' eTuxev, ucnrep XEYU), TQ TrpoTepaigt TT\S 8IKT}S yeyovos. 8ia 
TAOTA Kai iroXus xpovos eyivero T$ 8ECTMOMIPIQ) o ^€Ta£ii TT(S 8IKT)S Te 
Kai TOI) ©avaTou. 
